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William Baude

Rethinking the Federal Eminent Domain Power
abstract. It is black-letter law that the federal government has the power to take land
through eminent domain. This modern understanding, however, is a complete departure from
the Constitution’s historical meaning.
From the Founding until the Civil War, the federal government was thought to have an
eminent domain power only within the District of Columbia and the territories—but not within
states. Politicians and judges (including in two Supreme Court decisions) repeatedly denied the
existence of such a power, and when the federal government did need to take land, it relied on
state cooperation to do so. People during this period refused to infer a federal eminent domain
power from Congress’s enumerated powers or the Necessary and Proper Clause because they
viewed it as a “great power”—one that was too important to be left to implication. And they
refused to infer it from the Takings Clause either, because the Clause was not intended to
expand Congress's power beyond the District and territories.
Eminent domain aside, the notion of great powers is increasingly relevant after National
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, in which Chief Justice Roberts invoked a theory of
great powers to argue that the Necessary and Proper Clause could not justify the individual
mandate. While his application of the theory is questionable, there are many other areas of law—
such as commandeering, sovereign immunity, conscription, and the freedom of the press—
where the great powers idea may rightfully have more bearing.
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rethinking the federal eminent domain power

introduction
It is black-letter law that the federal government has the power to take land
through eminent domain, so long as it pays compensation. The Supreme Court
first established the existence of this power in the 1875 case of Kohl v. United
States,1 and it is now taken for granted. Many people can no longer imagine
that the power was ever controversial. The modern conventional wisdom,
however, is a complete departure from the historical understanding.
At the Founding, the federal government was not understood to have the
power to exercise eminent domain inside a state’s borders. This understanding
was reflected in seventy-five years of subsequent practice and precedent. The
federal government sometimes needed land—for roads, lighthouses, etc.—but
it did not use eminent domain to get it. Instead, it repeatedly relied on the
states to condemn the land it needed. During this period, federal practice,
congressional debates, and even two Supreme Court opinions all indicated a
lack of any general federal power of eminent domain.
Most of this has been forgotten. Some scholars mention the original
practice in passing, but they treat it as an oddity, with no suggestion that it had
a sensible constitutional justification.2 Major works on the early development
of the nation do not discuss the lack of federal eminent domain at all.3 Even
scholars broadly critical of the uses to which federal eminent domain has been
put do not challenge its historical legitimacy.4 The few scholars who do discuss
the federal power of condemnation simply do not discuss (or misinterpret)

1.
2.

3.

4.

91 U.S. 367 (1875).
See, e.g., David E. Engdahl, State and Federal Power over Federal Property, 18 ARIZ. L. REV. 283,
297-98 n.54 (1976); Matthew P. Harrington, Regulatory Takings and the Original
Understanding of the Takings Clause, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2053, 2081 n.132 (2004); Leigh
Raymond & Sally K. Fairfax, Fragmentation of Public Domain Law and Policy: An Alternative
to the “Shift-to-Retention” Thesis, 39 NAT. RESOURCES J. 649, 703-04 (1999); William
Michael Treanor, The Origins and Original Significance of the Just Compensation Clause of the
Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE L.J. 694, 709 n.78 (1985); D. Zachary Hudson, Note, Eminent
Domain Due Process, 119 YALE L.J. 1280, 1293-95 (2010).
E.g., DANIEL WALKER HOWE, WHAT HATH GOD WROUGHT: THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICA, 1815-1848 (2007); 1 G. EDWARD WHITE, LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY: FROM THE
COLONIAL YEARS THROUGH THE CIVIL WAR 262 (2012) (claiming in passing that eminent
domain “had been . . . conceded to the federal government by the Fifth Amendment”).
Ilya Somin, Eminent Domain Battle over Flight 93 Memorial Continues, VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (June 1, 2009, 1:27 PM), http://volokh.com/2009/06/01/eminent-domain
-battle-over-flight-93-memorial-continues. Professor Somin informs me that the historical
evidence has since induced him to change his mind.
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much of the historical evidence.5
The original view was that the federal government had eminent domain
power only in the District of Columbia and the territories, where the
Constitution expressly granted it plenary power. Eminent domain could not be
inferred from Congress’s enumerated powers or the Necessary and Proper
Clause because it was a great power, too important to be left to implication. As
mentioned above, this understanding was reflected in uniform, widespread
practice. While there certainly were expressions of the contrary view, especially
several decades after the Founding, those views were not actually reflected in
any judicial holding or federal practice until the Civil War. Meanwhile, during
this period the Supreme Court declared—in a surprisingly neglected
decision—that outside of the District and the territories “the United States
have no constitutional capacity to exercise . . . eminent domain.”6
One might think that a broad eminent domain power was either created or
presupposed by the Takings Clause, but this is also not the case. As for
creation: the Clause merely creates a right to compensation, and such a right
ought not imply an extension of federal power. Indeed, the Ninth Amendment
was written in order to forbid precisely this sort of implication—that the
presence of rights in the Constitution implied that the federal government
would otherwise have had the power to infringe them. As for presupposition:
it is far more likely that the Clause was meant to deal with the District and the
territories, the latter of which had been governed by a predecessor of the
Takings Clause in the Northwest Ordinance. In any event, inference from the
enactment of the Takings Clause can be perilous—unlike any other clause in
the Bill of Rights, ratifying states did not request it in any form, and it was
proposed and ratified with little comment. If anything, the silence suggests
that the Clause does not reflect any serious fear of a federal eminent domain
power.
The Supreme Court’s eventual decision in Kohl was not consistent with the
best understandings of the enumerated powers or the Takings Clause, and it

5.

6.

Adam S. Grace, From the Lighthouses: How the First Federal Internal Improvement Projects
Created Precedent That Broadened the Commerce Clause, Shrunk the Takings Clause, and Affected
Early Nineteenth Century Constitutional Debate, 68 ALB. L. REV. 97, 139-48 (2004); Gary
Lawson & David B. Kopel, Bad News for Professor Koppelman: The Incidental
Unconstitutionality of the Individual Mandate, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 267, 280-82 (2011),
http://yalelawjournal.org/2011/11/08/lawson&kopel.html. The late David Currie also
discussed the issue in passing in DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE
JEFFERSONIANS, 1801-1829, at 276-77, 312 n.188 (2001). I discuss these arguments in the text
accompanying infra notes 148-164, 177-179, 317 (Grace); 155, 180-184 (Currie); and 383-386
(Lawson and Kopel).
Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 223 (1845).
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gave remarkably short shrift to many decades of practice and precedent. The
decision appears to have been motivated instead by a constitutional theory that
came to prominence after the Civil War. Courts also relied on this theory of
inherent powers (unconnected to the enumerated powers) in contemporaneous
cases finding inherent power over immigration, governance of the Indian
tribes, and other issues. Kohl further drew on another contemporaneous
theory—that federal and state sovereignty occupied separate spheres,
forbidding any constitutional rule that would make one dependent on the
other. Both the inherent powers and separate spheres theories were important
breaks from the past, and they have recently come under strong criticism. That
skepticism should be extended to federal eminent domain.
If the federal government was originally thought to lack the power of
eminent domain, there remains the question of what relevance that history
possesses today. Its implications depend on one’s interpretive methodology.
For originalists, the direct implications for constitutional meaning are
fairly straightforward. Yet nonoriginalists should also find the argument
relevant. Original meaning is an important ingredient in many
nonoriginalist interpretive theories,7 especially when borne out by widespread
post-ratification practice.8
Federal eminent domain has become a widespread and largely
unquestioned part of the federal government’s land-acquisition practice. In
1978 and 1979, the General Accounting Office (GAO) reported between seven
and eight thousand new federal condemnations each year.9 The normalization
of the federal eminent domain power may be exacerbated by the current
statutory authorization for taking land, which categorically allows any officer
who is authorized to buy land to initiate an eminent domain proceeding
without further specific authorization.10

7.

8.

9.
10.

See, e.g., Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism Is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 10 & n.21 (2009)
(describing as nearly universal the view that “the proper originalist object (whatever it may
be) should count among the data that interpreters treat as relevant”); Michael C. Dorf,
Integrating Normative and Descriptive Constitutional Theory: The Case of Original Meaning, 85
GEO. L.J. 1765, 1766 (1997) (“[V]irtually all practitioners of and commentators on
constitutional law accept that original meaning has some relevance to constitutional
interpretation.”).
Larry Kramer, Fidelity to History—and Through It, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1627, 1654-55 (1997);
H. Jefferson Powell, Joseph Story’s Commentaries on the Constitution: A Belated Review, 94
YALE L.J. 1285, 1297-98 (1985) (book review).
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CED-80-54, FEDERAL LAND ACQUISITIONS BY
CONDEMNATION—OPPORTUNITIES TO REDUCE DELAYS AND COSTS 2 (1980).
40 U.S.C. § 3113 (2006) (“An officer of the Federal Government authorized to acquire real
estate for the erection of a public building or for other public uses may acquire the real estate
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At the same time, there are at least some hints of change in the modern
practice. Another GAO report (in 1979) suggested that the federal government
should curtail its use of eminent domain, arguing that eminent domain was
“time-consuming and expensive,” and that the government already had plenty
of land.11 And while there have been no comprehensive accounts of federal
eminent domain since 1978, responses to Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
requests suggest that it may be declining. One agency reported that it has used
eminent domain infrequently in recent years because the agency has already
obtained most of the property it needs.12 Other agencies report that they only
perform “friendly” condemnations; for example, the Postal Service reports only
a single condemnation since 2000—a “friendly” one designed to circumvent
laws that prevent members of Congress from benefiting from federal
contracts.13
In National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius,14 for example,
understanding federal eminent domain is also of relevance to federalism more
broadly. Chief Justice Roberts invoked a theory of great powers to argue that
the Necessary and Proper Clause could not justify the individual mandate.15 At
the same time, the example of eminent domain may not support his use of the
theory: the historical evidence that imposing mandates is a great power is not
comparable to the evidence that eminent domain was. Even though
imposing mandates may not be a great power, there are other contemporary
questions—such as commandeering, sovereign immunity, conscription, and
the freedom of the press—where the great powers idea may rightfully have
more bearing.
The Article will proceed as follows. The Supreme Court’s 1875 decision in
Kohl invoked three interpretive arguments for recognizing an implicit federal
power of eminent domain—enumerated powers, the Takings Clause, and
inherent authority based in constitutional structure. Parts I through IV take
those arguments as their organizing principle, providing historical background

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

for the Government by condemnation, under judicial process, when the officer believes that
it is necessary or advantageous to the Government to do so.”).
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CED-80-14, THE FEDERAL DRIVE TO ACQUIRE PRIVATE
LANDS SHOULD BE REASSESSED 9 (1979).
Telephone Interview with Kim Winn, Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) specialist,
Bonneville Power Admin. (Aug. 15, 2012).
Letter from Jim Allen, Program Analyst, U.S. Postal Serv., to author (Sept. 24, 2012) (on file
with author); Telephone Interview with Janet Bruner, Fish & Wildlife Serv. (Sept. 7, 2012).
132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
Id. at 2591-93 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.); see also id. at 2626-28 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in
part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (criticizing this holding).
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to show why they were not widely thought persuasive until shortly before
Kohl. Part I discusses whether a takings power could have been deduced from
the enumerated powers and the Necessary and Proper Clause; it also
introduces the concept of great powers. Part II details the subsequent practice
of eminent domain, relevant especially to the enumerated powers argument,
but ultimately to all three. Part III discusses whether such a power would have
been thought to be implied or presupposed by the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. Part IV discusses a set of structural arguments for an eminent
domain power that do not hinge on any provision of the Constitution’s text.
Part V applies the insights of the first four Parts to contemporary issues.
Finally, a preliminary note on methodology. My recovery here of the
history of eminent domain has both descriptive and normative purposes. The
historical discussion in Parts I to IV aims to recover how eminent domain and
the enumerated powers were conceptualized and practiced at and after the
Founding. Generally, any readers interested in the history should be able to
read those Parts without regard to whether they share my normative
commitments about the relevance of that history. Part V introduces my own
views about the relevance of that history for the Constitution’s meaning under
a version of originalism to which I subscribe; but one need not subscribe to
that methodology in order to find the history relevant.
i. enumerated powers
When the power to establish post-offices and to create courts within
the States was conferred upon the Federal government, included in it
was authority to obtain sites for such offices and for court-houses, and
to obtain them by such means as were known and appropriate. The
right of eminent domain was one of those means well known when the
Constitution was adopted, and employed to obtain lands for public
uses. Its existence, therefore, in the grantee of that power, ought not to
be questioned.
—Kohl v. United States16
Eminent domain is the sovereign’s power to take property—
paradigmatically land—without its owner’s consent.17 Conventional histories

16.
17.

91 U.S. 367, 372 (1875).
Under some conceptions, the power of eminent domain may have extended to all property,
but other sources treated realty as special—including in disputes about federal authority. See
infra Subsection I.C.2 & Section III.D. This Article will focus on the paradigm case of the
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trace the term itself back to Hugo Grotius,18 and other political theorists
discussed it, too.19 The power was known in Britain by the time of the
Founding,20 but the Constitution itself does not mention it explicitly.
The Constitution delegates to Congress a list of certain enumerated
powers. Article I includes some important items, like declaring war and raising
armies and collecting taxes.21 It also includes some things that have become
powers of secondary importance, like regulating the value of foreign coin and
establishing post roads.22 But taking private property is not on the list. Article
IV does give Congress the “Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and
Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United
States,”23 but it makes no mention of any power to dispose of or regulate
property that still belongs to others, whether within those territories or within
the states. The question is what to make of this omission.
A. The Puzzle of Implied Powers
Many federal powers exist only by implication. The Constitution does not
explicitly mention that Congress can create corporations or cabinet-level offices
to administer the law. It does not explicitly say that Congress can create civil
and criminal liability for those who infringe most federal laws. Indeed, the
Constitution does not explicitly say much about how Congress may go about
effectuating most of its granted powers. These powers must either be implicit
in the grant of some other power, or (and this will turn out to be much the

18.

19.

20.
21.
22.
23.

power to take land; whichever side personalty falls on, it affects the scope of the argument at
the periphery, not the strength at the core.
2 HUGO GROTIUS, THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE 164 (Louise R. Loomis trans., Walter J.
Black, Inc. 1949) (1625); see SUSAN REYNOLDS, BEFORE EMINENT DOMAIN: TOWARD A
HISTORY OF EXPROPRIATION OF LAND FOR THE COMMON GOOD 2-3, 94-100 (2010).
See William B. Stoebuck, A General Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 WASH. L. REV. 553, 559-60
(1972). Other discussions include SAMUEL PUFENDORF, ON THE DUTY OF MAN AND CITIZEN
ACCORDING TO NATURAL LAW 166-67 (James Tully ed., Michael Silverthorne trans.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1673); 2 SAMUEL PUFENDORF, ON THE LAW OF NATURE AND
NATIONS 1285-86 (C.H. Oldfather & W.A. Oldfather trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1934)
(1688); EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS § 244, at 232-33 (Béla Kapossy & Richard
Whatmore eds., Thomas Nugent trans., Liberty Fund 2008) (1758); 2 CORNELIUS VAN
BYNKERSHOEK, QUAESTIONUM JURIS PUBLICI 218 (Tenney Frank trans., Oxford Univ. Press
1930) (1737).
See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *139.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 11-12.
Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 5, 7.
Id. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
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same thing) encompassed by the sweeping Clause empowering Congress to
“make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution
the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the
Government of the United States or in any Department or Officer thereof.”24
Similarly, a federal eminent domain power—to whatever extent it exists—must
be found by implication. After all, the government does not ordinarily take
property simply for its own sake. It takes it as a means to do something else,
such as building a fort or a lighthouse or a road. If Congress has power to build
those things,25 it might also have the implied power to condemn land to do it.
The Court has defended an implied power of eminent domain along exactly
these lines. In Kohl v. United States, the Court first upheld this implied power,
saying that “the power to establish post-offices and to create courts within the
States . . . included in it . . . authority to obtain sites for such offices and for
court-houses, and to obtain them by such means as were known and
appropriate,” such as eminent domain.26 A later case, United States v. Gettysburg
Electric Railway Co., invoked the Necessary and Proper Clause explicitly: “The
right to condemn at all is not [expressly] given. It results from the powers that
are given, and it is implied because of its necessity, or because it is appropriate
in exercising those powers.”27 Or as Charles Black put it: “Since the
Constitution grants specific powers to the federal government to maintain
armies and build courthouses and post offices, it is axiomatic that a right of
eminent domain accompanies these powers as a necessary tool to effectuate
them.”28
The same could be said for many other federal powers, such as the power
to create a corporation, the power to imprison people for violating the law, or
the power to force states into court against their will. The Constitution does
not expressly mention these powers or grant them to Congress, but they seem
implicit in the grant of other powers. If Congress can create a bank, why can’t
that bank be a corporation? If Congress can create laws, why can’t it enforce
them through criminal sanctions for private persons and coercive suits for

24.
25.

26.
27.
28.

Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD, 1789-1801,
at 225 n.150 (1997) (discussing the controversy over federal road construction); id. at 69-70
(discussing the same for lighthouses).
91 U.S. 367, 372 (1875).
160 U.S. 668, 681 (1896) (citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421
(1819)).
Charles Black, The Forest and the Trees in Constitutional Law, 7 PACE L. REV. 475, 484 n.22
(1987) (citing Kohl, 91 U.S. at 371); see also CURRIE, supra note 5, at 277 (relying on the
Necessary and Proper Clause).
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states?
Yet the implied powers doctrine has not, in practice, proceeded quite that
automatically. At the Founding and during the early days of the country, for
example, there were serious arguments that Congress did not have the power
to charter corporations.29 While the very first Congress created federal
crimes,30 there were a few early constitutional objections to an implied
criminalization power.31 And, as we will see, there was a widespread view that
the federal government could not exercise eminent domain when acquiring
land for a federal purpose.
Even today, the Court does not always allow the Necessary and Proper
Clause to sustain an implied federal power, even when that power is useful to
carrying out a concededly permissible end. For example, the Court has not
allowed Congress to “commandeer” unwilling state officers into enforcing
federal law.32 The Court has not allowed Congress to abrogate a state’s
traditional immunity from compulsory legal process, even to enforce a valid
federal law.33 And just last term, in National Federation of Independent Business v.
Sebelius, five Justices separately suggested that Congress could not force all
individuals to purchase health insurance, even in an attempt to make more
efficient a concededly permissible federal regulatory scheme.34
The exact rationale for the modern cases is obscure. Printz suggested that
commandeering could be “necessary” but not “proper.”35 Some sovereign
immunity cases seemed to rely on an implied prohibition by the Eleventh
Amendment.36 Later cases said instead that “sovereign immunity derives not
from the Eleventh Amendment but from the structure of the original
Constitution itself,” and (invoking Printz) that an attempt to abrogate that

29.
30.
31.

32.
33.

34.
35.
36.

See infra notes 49-64 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Act of Apr. 30, 1790 (Crimes Act), 1 Stat. 112 (1790).
See Kentucky Resolutions of 1798 and 1799, reprinted in 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL
STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 540, 540 (Jonathan
Elliot ed., Washington D.C., 2d ed. 1836); 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2151-52 (1798) (statement of
Rep. Nathaniel Macon).
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 730-54 (1999); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44,
57-73 (1996). The Court has held exercises of power under the Bankruptcy Clause and the
Fourteenth Amendment to be exceptions. Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356,
377-78 (2006); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 452-56 (1976).
132 S. Ct. 2566, 2591-93 (2012) (opinion of Roberts, C.J.); id. at 2641-47 (joint dissent).
Printz, 521 U.S. at 923-35.
See, e.g., Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 54.
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immunity is not “proper” under the Necessary and Proper Clause.37 The Chief
Justice’s opinion in Sebelius suggested similar limitations on the Necessary and
Proper Clause.38
Each of these rationales depends on an implicit limit to the powers implied
by the Necessary and Proper Clause. But the decisions are vague about what
kind of limit this is, or where it comes from. There are hints that the modern
limits are derived from history. The Chief Justice’s opinion in the Sebelius, for
example, quoted McCulloch v. Maryland in arguing that while “the Clause gives
Congress authority to ‘legislate on that vast mass of incidental powers which
must be involved in the constitution,’ it does not license the exercise of any
‘great substantive and independent power[s]’ beyond those specifically
enumerated.”39 But he did not explain the provenance or implications of that
statement.
As it turns out, there is an old, established line of thinking about the
implicit limitations on Congress’s enumerated powers—a line of thinking that
ultimately underlies the original arguments against federal eminent domain,
among others.
B. The Idea of Great Powers
The basic idea was this: not all constitutional powers are equally amenable
to being found by implication. When a minor power is incidentally necessary
to effectuating some explicit constitutional power, it could be implied. But
some powers are so great, so important, or so substantive, that we should not
assume that they were granted by implication, even if they might help
effectuate an enumerated power. These powers, sometimes called “great
powers,” are the kinds of powers we would expect the Constitution to mention
if they were granted.40
The structure of the U.S. government was somewhat novel. The federal
government had limited powers, and it had a written Constitution which
purported to enumerate those powers. Much of the doctrine for implementing
this new Constitution had to be worked out in the early years of the Republic.
But there were historical antecedents to the Constitution’s legal structure. As
Mary Bilder has shown, for example, judicial review of laws “repugnant” to the

37.
38.
39.
40.

Alden, 527 U.S. at 728; id. at 732-33 (quoting Printz, 521 U.S. at 923-24).
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2592 (Roberts, C.J.).
Id. at 2591 (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 411, 421 (1819)).
As will become apparent, I use the term “great powers” because it is a point of commonality
between several important formulations of the idea.
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Constitution had roots in the pre-Revolutionary review of municipal and
corporate charters.41
Others have amplified a connection between American constitutionalism
and British administrative law in a way that is relevant for present purposes.
For example, when one person delegated authority to another, courts
frequently had to decide whether the granted authority implicitly gave
additional authority to help carry out the grant. The doctrine generally
provided that a “principal” power carried with it “incidental” powers, even if
they were not enumerated.42 Incidental powers were of lesser stature, in some
sense, than principal powers.43 And unlike incidental powers, principal powers
had to be expressly enumerated.
It makes sense for these basic principles of implied powers to carry over to
construing the government’s delegated power under the Constitution. As an
abstract matter, the Constitution was like these other delegations, since it was a
grant of authority from the people to the institutions of federal government.44
Indeed, both before and after ratification, commentators repeatedly described
the Necessary and Proper Clause as confirming established principles of
implicit or incidental powers. Alexander Hamilton said in The Federalist that
the Clause was “only declaratory of a truth, which would have resulted by
necessary and unavoidable implication from the very act of constituting a
federal government, and vesting it with certain specified powers.”45 Madison
later reminded people that the Clause was “in fact, merely declaratory of what
would have resulted . . . as the appropriate, as it were, technical means of
executing those powers. In this sense it had been explained, by the friends of
the constitution, and ratified by the State conventions.”46 Lawyers would thus

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Mary Sarah Bilder, The Corporate Origins of Judicial Review, 116 YALE L.J. 502 (2006).
Robert G. Natelson, The Legal Origins of the Necessary and Proper Clause, in THE ORIGINS OF
THE NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE 52, 60 (Gary Lawson et al. eds., 2010).
Id. at 61-63.
U.S. CONST. pmbl.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 33, at 158 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Carey & James McClellan
eds., 2001).
James Madison, Speech on Feb. 2, 1791, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE AND DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE BANK OF THE UNITED STATES 39, 42 (photo. reprint 2008) (1832)
[hereinafter HISTORY OF THE BANK]; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 44, supra note 45, at 234-35
(James Madison) (arguing that without the Clause, the same powers would have been
implied); ALEXANDER HAMILTON, ON THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A NATIONAL BANK (1791),
reprinted in HISTORY OF THE BANK, supra, at 95, 99 (arguing that the Clause “gives an
explicit sanction to the doctrine of implied powers”); Akhil Reed Amar, Constitutional
Redundancies and Clarifying Clauses, 33 VAL. U. L. REV. 1, 7-10 (1998) (arguing that the
Clause was clarifying, but redundant).
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have understood the words “necessary and proper” to invoke the “incidental
powers” doctrine that had developed under existing principles of law.47
It is not clear that actual practice reflected every detail of the “incidental
powers” doctrine.48 But practice confirmed the general idea that certain “great”
powers were not implied by the Necessary and Proper Clause. Indeed, the early
debate about the constitutionality of the Bank of the United States was
conducted in just these terms. The proposed bill created the Bank as a
corporation. There was no explicit clause in the Constitution granting the
power to create corporations and some arguments going either way. The
Continental Congress had created a bank; but it was questionable whether it
had acted lawfully in doing so.49 The Convention had rejected a proposal to
give Congress the explicit power to charter corporations for canals or other
purposes,50 but the proceedings were off the record and therefore arguably not
dispositive.51 So when Congress and President Washington deliberated over
the constitutionality of the Bank bill, they were forced to work from first
principles.
In the House of Representatives, Madison argued against the bill and laid
out his view of the “preliminaries to a right interpretation” of the
Constitution.52 Congress possessed implied powers that were necessary and
proper to its expressly enumerated ones, and there were two considerations
relevant to identifying them: “In admitting or rejecting a constructive
authority, not only the degree of its incidentality to an express authority is to
be regarded, but the degree of its importance also; since on this will depend the
probability or improbability of its being left to construction.”53 In other words,

47.

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Robert G. Natelson, The Framing and Adoption of the Necessary and Proper Clause, in THE
ORIGINS OF THE NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE, supra note 42, at 84, 85; see also John
Harrison, Enumerated Federal Power and the Necessary and Proper Clause, 78 U. CHI. L. REV.
1101, 1122 (2011) (book review) (concluding that on this issue “the authors [in The Origins of
the Necessary and Proper Clause] make a strong case”); John F. Manning, The Necessary and
Proper Clause and Its Legal Antecedents, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1349, 1371 (2012) (book review) (“I
have no problem concluding that the Necessary and Proper Clause is an incidental powers
clause.”).
Manning, supra note 47, at 1374-75.
Madison, supra note 46, at 41 (“That was known . . . to have been the child of necessity. It
never could be justified by the regular powers of the articles of confederation.”).
2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 615-16 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed.
1966) [hereinafter RECORDS].
For early arguments about the relevance of the Convention’s proceedings, see H. Jefferson
Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885, 914-21 (1985).
Madison, supra note 46, at 40.
Id.

1751

the yale law journal

122:1738

2013

the fact that a power was useful for executing an enumerated power was
relevant, but not dispositive. If the power was important enough, it was one
that the Constitution would be expected to grant explicitly, if at all.
Madison elaborated. Without such a rule, many of the enumerated powers
did not make sense. Calling out the militia and raising armies were useful to
declaring war, for example, but they had been expressly added. This principle
could be taken too far, for “not . . . every insertion or omission in the
constitution is the effect of systematic attention”54—but history and logic
nonetheless produced a sensible rule of interpretation. “They condemn the
exercise of any power, particularly a great and important power, which is not
evidently and necessarily involved in an express power.”55 Creating the Bank,
Madison argued, was “an important power,” and hence could not be implied.56
The framework was not just Madison’s. The bill passed over his objection,
and President Washington called for opinions about whether to sign it.57
Attorney General Edmund Randolph also thought the bill unconstitutional and
took a similar view of implied powers. He wrote that “[t]o be necessary is to be
incidental,”58 and in analyzing the overlap between the other enumerated
powers, he noted each power was “either incidental, or substantive, that is,
independent.”59 If incidental, they could be implied. If they “be substantive and
independent,” then their enumeration “bestow[ed] an independent power,
where it would not otherwise have existed.”60
Hamilton defended the bill, but he admitted the principle and disputed
only the application. He “deemed admissible” Randolph’s theory that “‘[t]o be
necessary, is to be incidental,’”61 but accused the Bank’s critics of a “strange
fallacy”: “An incorporation seems to have been regarded as some great
independent substantive thing; as a political engine, and of peculiar magnitude

54.
55.
56.

57.
58.

59.

60.
61.
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Id. at 43.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.; see also James Madison, Speech in the House of Representatives (Feb. 7, 1791), reprinted
in HISTORY OF THE BANK, supra note 46, at 82, 82 (“The power of granting charters . . . is a
great and important power . . . .”).
Powell, supra note 51, at 914.
Memorandum from Edmund Randolph, Att’y Gen. of the U.S., to George Washington,
President of the U.S. (Feb. 12, 1791), reprinted in HISTORY OF THE BANK, supra note 46, at 86,
89.
Memorandum from Edmund Randolph, Att’y Gen. of the U.S., to George Washington,
President of the U.S. (Feb. 12, 1791), reprinted in HISTORY OF THE BANK, supra note 46, at 89,
90.
Id.
HAMILTON, supra note 46, at 99 (quoting Randolph, supra note 58).
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and moment . . . .”62 He went on, emphasizing Roman and British precedents,
to show “[t]hat the importance of the power of incorporation has been
exaggerated, leading to erroneous conclusions.”63 Thus, Hamilton
summarized, “the power to erect corporations, is not to be considered as an
independent and substantive power, but as an incidental and auxiliary one; and
was, therefore, more properly left to implication, than expressly granted.”64
This theory was endorsed in McCulloch even as the Supreme Court
concluded that the Bank was constitutional. Chief Justice Marshall affirmed the
power to create the Bank, and in doing so laid out a framework for assessing
the government’s implied powers. After discussing the great ends of the state,
Marshall wrote: “It is not denied, that the powers given to the government
imply the ordinary means of execution.”65 He added that “those who contend
that it may not select any appropriate means, that one particular mode of
effecting the object is excepted, take upon themselves the burden of
establishing that exception.”66 Marshall also conceded, however, that there was
a type of power for which that burden could be met, and an exception
established. He explained that “[t]he power of creating a corporation, though
appertaining to sovereignty, is not, like the power of making war, or levying
taxes, or of regulating commerce, a great substantive and independent power,
which cannot be implied as incidental to other powers, or used as a means of
executing them.”67
After this discussion, McCulloch makes its first mention of the Necessary
and Proper Clause, noting that the Constitution “has not left the right of
Congress to employ the necessary means . . . to general reasoning,”68
suggesting that the Chief Justice endorsed the common view that the Clause
confirmed the doctrine of implied powers. He then devoted several famous
pages to challenging Luther Martin’s argument that the Clause was “really
restrictive of the general right, which might otherwise be implied, of selecting

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

68.

Id. at 97.
Id.
Id. at 105.
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 409 (1819).
Id. at 410.
Id. at 411 (emphasis added); see also id. at 373-74 (argument of counsel for Maryland)
(arguing that incorporation is one of the great powers); Caleb Nelson, Sovereign Immunity as
a Doctrine of Personal Jurisdiction, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1559, 1639-43 (2002) (drawing attention
to this passage).
McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 411.
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means for executing the enumerated powers.”69 On Marshall’s understanding
of the Necessary and Proper Clause, Congress had incidental powers in
addition to the enumerated ones. When a governmental power is merely
“incidental,” it can be implied, but there are other powers that are so great that
they cannot be found in the Necessary and Proper Clause.70
The great powers framework also makes a great deal of sense. The
framework helps us understand, for example, why the Constitution specifically
and separately enumerates Congress’s power to “lay and collect Taxes.”71 If it
were not for the idea of great powers, taxes would not need to be enumerated.
Imagine that an unqualified means-ends rule were correct: Congress needs
money to pay officials, hire troops, create courts, and otherwise carry out its
many powers and duties. If Congress has all powers, great and small, that are
helpful to carrying out its other powers, then surely it would implicitly have a
general power to tax already. There would be no need to enumerate it.
The great powers doctrine explains why the separate enumeration of the
taxing power was not redundant.72 Inadequate taxing power had been one of
the major defects of government under the Articles of Confederation.73 If the
new Constitution had made no mention of changing the tax power present
under the failed Articles, few people would have assumed that the problem had
secretly been solved by implication. That is because, as Marshall put it,
“levying taxes” is “a great substantive and independent power.”74 It was
therefore entirely reasonable to expect that power to be dealt with on its own
terms.75 (This is not to say that every explicitly enumerated power is a great one

69.
70.

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. at 412.
See John Marshall, A Friend of the Constitution, ALEXANDRIA GAZETTE (D.C.), July 1, 1819,
reprinted in JOHN MARSHALL’S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND 161, 162-63 (Gerald
Gunther ed., 1969) (“I am perfectly willing to admit” that “fairly incidental [is] in other
words . . . necessary and proper.”).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
See McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 373-74 (argument of counsel for Maryland).
See, e.g., James Madison, Preface to Debates in the Convention of 1787, reprinted in 3 RECORDS,
supra note 50, at 539, 547 (recording earlier drafts).
McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 411.
Some readers have suggested that the tax power is specifically enumerated so as to make it
possible to contain specific limitations, like the separate requirement that “No Capitation, or
other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9,
cl. 4. Yet in other places the Constitution contains limitations on powers that it grants only
by implication, such as the restrictions on granting titles of nobility, id. cl. 8, or on
suspending habeas, id. cl. 2; see Amanda L. Tyler, Suspension as an Emergency Power, 118 YALE
L.J. 600, 664-65 (2009) (“[T]he Clause is framed in the negative and therefore merely
implies that [suspension] is permitted [in some cases].”). So the restrictions on the tax
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that could not otherwise be implied—just that the great powers concept helps
to explain some of the enumerations.76)
Indeed, the great powers idea may explain Hamilton’s otherwise baffling
suggestion that the Federal Constitution needed no Bill of Rights because
Congress hadn’t been given any rights-infringing powers. In The Federalist,
Hamilton asked: “Why, for instance, should it be said, that the liberty of the
press shall not be restrained, when no power is given by which restrictions may
be imposed?”77 Hamilton’s claim seems ridiculous to modern eyes.78 One can
see how the government might argue that the power to suppress speech is
helpful to carrying out one’s governing agenda,79 or that general warrants are
helpful for laying and collecting taxes.80 So it is hard to see what Hamilton was
talking about. But within the great powers framework Hamilton’s argument
makes more sense. Perhaps Hamilton meant that the power to regulate the
press, or the power to authorize general immunity from state trespass law, was
a great power, like the power to raise armies or lay taxes.81
C. Eminent Domain as a Great Power
To understand the complexity of the federal eminent domain power will
require us to look at history, especially the seventy-five years in which
Congress was widely thought to lack a general power of eminent domain.82
Indeed, I will argue that that history helped to settle any ambiguity about the
scope of the eminent domain power.83 But even before that practice, other

76.

77.
78.

79.

80.
81.

82.
83.

power do not explain why the tax power, unlike the suspension power, is explicitly
enumerated.
Accord Madison, supra note 46, at 43 (“It is not pretended, that every insertion or omission
in the constitution is the effect of systematic attention. . . . The example cited, with others
that might be added, sufficiently inculcate, nevertheless, a rule of [great powers].”).
THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, supra note 45, at 445 (Alexander Hamilton).
Michael W. McConnell, Natural Rights and the Ninth Amendment: How Does Lockean Legal
Theory Assist in Interpretation?, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 1, 7 (2010) (calling this argument
“clearly wrong—even if Hamilton did make it”).
As George Mason warned. See George Mason, Speech at the Virginia Ratifying Convention
(June 14, 1788), reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES,
SOURCES, AND ORIGINS 650 (Neil H. Cogan ed., 1997).
As James Madison warned. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 438 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).
For further explanation, see infra Subsection V.B.1.d. The ultimate passage of the Bill of
Rights does not necessarily reflect a rejection of this theory, but rather the need for “greater
caution,” as Madison’s draft put it. See infra Section III.C.
See infra Part II.
See infra Subsection V.A.1.
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background principles provided some indication that eminent domain might
be a great power.
1. The Taxation Analogy
In Britain, Parliament could authorize the taking of private property,
perhaps subject to a requirement of compensation. The power was also subject
to a type of nondelegation rule. Under British practice, the King could exercise
powers that were “incidental” to his core powers or to the powers granted him
by statute. But one power that was never considered “incidental” was the
power of eminent domain. It had to be granted explicitly by Parliament, not
carried through by implication.84 In this respect, the power to condemn was
like the power to tax. The power to tax was similarly Parliament’s, and could
be exercised only by legislation actually saying so.85
Under one possible view of “great powers,” the British treatment of
eminent domain would establish it to be a “great power.” This view would be
that any power that had to be explicitly granted to the King by Parliament
under British law would have to be explicitly granted to the federal
government by the Constitution under American law. The idea would be that
in Britain, Parliament was a representative body of the people with plenary
legislative power, and that the analogous body here is the people acting in
ratifying conventions.86 On the other hand, there are many ways in which the
two structures could be distinguished, and it is not at all clear that the powers
that were thought of as “great” consistently mapped onto powers that had
similar status under British law. I mention this possibility only because it
might be one useful aspect in understanding the nature of a power.
More revealing, however, is that historically the powers to tax and to
condemn were conceptually linked. Vattel’s discussion of the two was

84.

85.
86.

See Stoebuck, supra note 19, at 562-66; see also REYNOLDS, supra note 18, at 41-42 (discussing
the evolution of the rule that Parliament must authorize eminent domain). The same rule
did not necessarily obtain in the colonies, where there was much debate about how to
translate principles of English law. See MARY SARAH BILDER, THE TRANSATLANTIC
CONSTITUTION: COLONIAL LEGAL CULTURE AND THE EMPIRE 31-50 (2004); P.J. Marshall,
Parliament and Property Rights in the Late Eighteenth-Century British Empire, in EARLY
MODERN CONCEPTIONS OF PROPERTY 530, 531, 539 (John Brewer & Susan Staves eds., 1995).
Stoebuck, supra note 19, at 568.
E.g., Gary Lawson & Guy I. Seidman, Necessity, Properity, and Reasonableness, in THE
ORIGINS OF THE NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE, supra note 42, at 120, 121-25, 134-36
(pursuing this analogy).
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interrelated,87 and some readers believe that he used the phrase “eminent
domain” to include both taxation and condemnation together.88 Similarly,
Locke grouped them together when arguing that deprivations of property
required popular consent—hence, parliamentary approval.89
As noted above, we do have some reason to believe that taxation was a great
power. For one thing, Chief Justice Marshall—no foe of federal power—said
so.90 For another, the power to tax is explicitly enumerated, which would be
unnecessary were it not a great power.91 If eminent domain and taxation were
conceptually linked, then maybe eminent domain is also best seen as a great
power. Like the tax power, it involves a deprivation of property without
individualized consent. Like the tax power, it was considered a great,
nonincidental power under British practice. So perhaps the fact that taxation is
enumerated but eminent domain is not is because the federal government has
the former power but not the latter.92
To be sure, eminent domain, after the passage of the Takings Clause of the
Fifth Amendment, is compensated. And it is possible that the power would
have been understood to be compensated even in the absence of the Clause.93
Nonetheless, it still amounts to an abrogation of property rights that is
permissible only because of special sovereign power. It comes into play only
when the government cannot purchase the land voluntarily—precisely because
the landowner wants more money than he is offered or prefers the land to any
price.

87.
88.

89.

90.
91.
92.

93.

VATTEL, supra note 19, at 232.
See FORREST MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE
CONSTITUTION 13 & n.7 (1985) (acknowledging that “eminent domain” later came to mean
condemnation specifically).
See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 360-61 (Peter Laslett ed., 1988) (1690).
For further discussion of the link, see LEONARD W. LEVY, THE LAW OF THE COMMONWEALTH
AND CHIEF JUSTICE SHAW 121-23 (1957); and Stoebuck, supra note 19, at 571-72.
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 411 (1819).
See supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
Again, one might argue that the power to tax is enumerated in order to impose limitations
like uniformity and apportionment on it. But there is no connection between enumeration
and limitation. The Suspension Clause limits the habeas power, even though the power is
granted only by implication, and the Takings Clause, of course, limits the power to take
even though it is not expressly granted. See supra note 75.
See infra notes 307-312 and accompanying text (discussing whether takings were
compensated in the absence of an express constitutional requirement).
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2. Real Property
Ratification of the Constitution also included specific discussion about
state power over real property. Supporters of the Constitution repeatedly
stressed certain subjects as beyond Congress’s powers—among them “the right
of altering the laws of . . . titles of lands.”94 Tench Coxe, a Federalist who wrote
a series of essays defending the Constitution, made the most grandiose
statement: “The lordship of the soil is one of the most valuable and powerful
appendages of sovereignty—This remains in full perfection with every state.
From them must grants flow . . . . To them also, as original and rightful
proprietaries and lords of the soil, will the estates of extinct families revert.”95
There were many others; as one scholar has summarized it, “Federalists
depicted the Constitution as leaving regulation of real property outside the
national authority.”96 Eminent domain (at least for land) is ultimately an
exercise of sovereign power over the laws of real property. So it might have
been a natural implication of these statements that the power of eminent
domain should also be reserved to the states.
To be sure, these statements did not explicitly refer to eminent domain as
such, and some of them may simply have meant that the regulation of real
property would not be sufficiently related to the federal power. That may be
the best way, for example, to understand Alexander Hamilton’s statement in
The Federalist that it would be “absurd . . . to believe, that a right to enact laws
necessary and proper for the imposition and collection of taxes, would involve
that of varying the rules of descent, and of the alienation of landed property.”97
Moreover, to the extent that this line of sources is thought dispositive, it might
suggest that there could be a federal power to condemn personal property, even
if not land.98

94.

95.
96.
97.
98.

Alexander White, Strictures on the Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the
Pennsylvania Convention, WINCHESTER VA. GAZETTE (Feb. 22, 1788), reprinted in 8 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 401, 404 (John P.
Kaminski et al. eds., 1988) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY].
[Tench Coxe], A Freeman III, PA. GAZETTE (Feb. 6, 1788), reprinted in 16 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 94, at 49, 51.
Robert G. Natelson, The Enumerated Powers of States, 3 NEV. L.J. 469, 481 (2003) (collecting
sources).
THE FEDERALIST NO. 29, supra note 45, at 141 (Alexander Hamilton).
See infra Section III.D (exploring this possibility further).

1758

rethinking the federal eminent domain power

3. The Enclaves Clause
Before discussing the practice of early takings for federal projects, it may
also be helpful to understand one piece of structural background—the
Constitution’s Enclaves Clause. The Clause is located in Article I and gives
Congress the power to exercise “exclusive Legislation in all Cases
whatsoever . . . over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of
the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines,
Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings.”99
It makes perfect sense for the federal government to have exclusive control
over its own forts and arsenals, especially given that states have limited
authority to keep troops or wage war on their own.100 Yet the Clause imposes
an important condition on that exclusive federal control—that the land must be
“purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State.”101
It is plausible that the word “purchased” could be construed to encompass
condemnations via eminent domain.102 That is not the only plausible
construction: early cases sometimes referred to the powers of “purchase” as
distinct from “condemnation” or “eminent domain.”103 But Blackstone had
conceptualized eminent domain as a forced sale,104 and English law soon came
to refer to eminent domain as a compulsory “purchase.”105 Noah Webster,
similarly, said that the “primary and legal sense” of “purchase” included any
means of obtaining property except descent.106

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

104.
105.

106.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
Id. art. I, § 10.
Id. art. I, § 8.
See Francis W. Laurent, Federal Areas Within the Exterior Boundaries of the States, 17 TENN. L.
REV. 328, 331 (1942) (endorsing this reading).
Chesapeake & Ohio Canal Co. v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 4 G. & J. 1, 3 (Md. 1832); accord
Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 374 (1875) (“[G]enerally, in statutes as in common use,
the word [“purchase”] is employed in a sense not technical, only as meaning acquisition by
contract between the parties, without governmental interference.”); see also Lessee of
Overmeyer v. Williams, 15 Ohio 26, 33 (1846) (differentiating a corporation’s power to
“make the necessary acquisitions of property, by purchase,” from “the other means
conferred upon them, to wit, the exercise of the delegated right of eminent domain”).
1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 20, at *135 (“All that the legislature does is to oblige the owner to
alienate his possessions for a reasonable price . . . .”).
Land Consolidation Act of 1845, 8 & 9 Vict., c. 18, § 15, 123; see also Arthur Lenhoff,
Development of the Concept of Eminent Domain, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 596, 602-05 (1942)
(tracing the “compulsory purchase” concept to Montesquieu as well as Blackstone).
2 NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (New York, S.
Converse 1828) (unpaginated entry for “purchase”).
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But even assuming that the federal government may acquire enclaves via
condemnation, the requirement of state consent puts that power in an
interesting context. The Enclaves Clause deals with some of the most
important buildings—those necessary for the national defense. It explicitly
references “Forts, Magazines, Arsenals,” and “dock-Yards,” at least three of
which have a decidedly military character.107 It also extends to “other needful
buildings,” which would have included buildings that satisfied a similar
military need.108 Joseph Story explained that exclusive jurisdiction was justified
because, among other things, “the nature of the military duties, which may be
required there . . . demand, that they should be exempted from state
authority.”109
The whole point of the Enclaves Clause is to oust any state jurisdiction, yet
even so, that power can only be exercised with state consent. This certainly
does not prove that state consent—actually, state legislative authority—was
required to condemn the land in the first place. But it does suggest that the
constitutional design anticipated state involvement in federal land acquisitions
and building projects.
Finally, it is worth noting that some interpreters have suggested that the
Enclaves Clause should be read more strongly: to forbid the government from
buying land in any manner (even consensually) unless it gets permission from
the state legislature.110 The idea is expressio unius est exclusio alterius—that the
Enclaves Clause describes the exclusive federal power to obtain land. Even
Madison suggested this at one point during the Bank debate.111 On its face,
however, the Enclaves Clause speaks to obtaining jurisdiction, not to obtaining
title. So perhaps Madison was recalling his original draft of the Clause, which
gave Congress the power “[t]o authorize the Executive to procure and hold for

107.
108.
109.

110.

111.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
Id.
3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1219, at
46 (Boston, Hillard, Gray & Co. 1833); accord James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134,
142 (1937) (“[I]t may be that the thought of such ‘strongholds’ was uppermost in the minds
of the framers.”). Subsequent cases have expanded the Clause to include “whatever
structures are found to be necessary in the performance of the functions of the Federal
Government,” James, 302 U.S. at 143, but if that is correct, it only expands the importance of
the set.
See, e.g., ELLEN FRANKEL PAUL, PROPERTY RIGHTS AND EMINENT DOMAIN 73 (1987); David I.
Lewittes, Constitutional Separation of War Powers: Protecting Public and Private Liberty, 57
BROOK. L. REV. 1083, 1150 (1992); C. Perry Patterson, The Relation of the Federal Government
to the Territories and the States in Landholding, 28 TEX. L. REV. 43, 60 (1950).
Madison, supra note 46, at 43 (“Congress could not purchase lands within a State, ‘without
the consent of its legislature.’”).
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the use of the U.S. landed property for the erection of Forts, Magazines, and
other necessary buildings.”112 But the convention had transformed the power
from one about procuring property to one about obtaining exclusive jurisdiction
(shortly before the state consent clause was added).113 And Congress generally
did not follow Madison’s suggestion: in 1790, it purchased the site for West
Point (with the owner’s consent) without waiting for state approval,114 and
early cases describe other federal land that was held without invoking the
Enclaves Clause.115
ii. the history of federal takings
The history of federal eminent domain is dominated by two important
facts. First, for the first seventy-five years of the Republic—at least until an
obscure 1864 taking statute affecting Rock Island, Illinois—there had never
been a purely federal taking inside a state. And even the few takings authorized
between 1864 and the 1875 decision in Kohl were sporadic and apparently did
not make much of an impression; it is not even clear that most of them were
performed. Kohl itself conceded (perhaps inaccurately) that there had never
before been a federal taking.116 Now, it is true enough, as Kohl also said, that
“the non-user of a power does not disprove its existence,”117 which brings us to
the second point. Throughout this period, a federal takings power was
explicitly denied—including by the Supreme Court, which declared that “the
United States have no constitutional capacity to exercise municipal jurisdiction,
sovereignty, or eminent domain,” except in the District and territories.118 After
several decades, there were some suggestions that the federal government had
and should exercise such a power (including by prominent thinkers like Henry
Clay and Joseph Story), but their views failed to persuade the majorities of
their day.
Moreover, the history reveals an entirely different way of executing federal

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

2 RECORDS, supra note 50, at 325.
Id. at 505, 509-10.
CURRIE, supra note 25, at 84 n.236.
See, e.g., People v. Godfrey, 17 Johns. 225 (N.Y. 1819); Commonwealth v. Young (Pa. 1818),
reprinted in 1 J. Jurisprudence 47 (Pa. 1821).
Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 373 (1875) (“It is true, this power of the Federal
government has not heretofore been exercised adversely.”).
Id. “Non-user” meant “failure to use.” 2 WEBSTER, supra note 106, at 181.
Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 222-23 (1845). For more discussion of the
case, see infra notes 188-195 and accompanying text.
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building projects. It is not as if the federal government never needed private
land before 1864 or 1875. Nor did the federal government always find itself
willing to pay what the owner wanted. But when the government needed land
for federal projects, it did not take it. Instead, it relied on the state’s
condemnation authority—either by having the state condemn the land and
then transfer it to the federal government, or by having federal agents proceed
as plaintiffs under state condemnation law. The lack of federal eminent domain
authority was not simply the oversight of an earlier time, but rather the result
of a well-functioning regime of cooperative federalism.
A. The First Twenty Years
During the first twenty years of the federal government, Congress built
quite a few things and sometimes needed eminent domain. But a federal
condemnation power was not proposed at all during this period, so far as one
can tell; the use of state power was uniform and unquestioned.
For example, when the federal government wanted to build lighthouses on
Baker’s Island and Cape Cod in Massachusetts, the state passed a statute
authorizing the federal government to “purchase or take as hereinafter is
provided, any tracts of Land which shall be found necessary and convenient.”119
The statute authorized a federal agent to apply to state court, where “three
Freeholders, impartial men” would “determine a just equivalent to the Owner
or Owners of such Land,” to be paid by the United States.120 It did the same for
a later federal lighthouse on Wigwam Point.121 The state also passed a very
similar statute authorizing the United States to take land on Governor’s Island
in Boston Harbor for “forts, magazines, arsenals, dock-yards, and other
needful buildings,” subject to state compensation procedure.122
The same occurred in Rhode Island. The legislature passed a statute for the
fortification of Newport which consented to the sale of land to the United
States, and added that if the federal government and an individual owner could
not agree “on the Value thereof,” the Governor could “appoint three suitable
Persons to appraise the said Lands” and force a transfer at that price.123

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Act of June 18, 1796, 1796 Mass. Acts 22.
Id. at 23.
Act of June 12, 1800, 1800 Mass. Acts 109.
Act of June 25, 1798, ch. 16, 1798 Mass. Acts 217.
Act of Mar. 1794, 1794 R.I. Acts & Resolves 11, 12. The forced sale is my inference from the
following: “[U]pon Payment of the Value thereof, at such Appraisement, or upon the
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New York passed a statute in 1790 ceding a lighthouse in Sandy Hook to
the United States. The land was partly owned by the state, but was also partly
owned by the estates of two dead men, Philip Livingston and William Bayard.
The trustees of their estates were “directed and required to grant release and
convey all their estate right title and interest . . . to the United States.”124 New
Jersey also passed a statute at the same time ceding its jurisdiction over the
land.125 A later New Jersey statute authorized the government to take more land
near the Sandy Hook lighthouse to erect a beacon, with compensation
determined by a New Jersey special jury.126
Other state statutes simply ceded land to the federal government that the
state already owned—for lighthouses127 or forts,128 for example. (I have not
determined which of these parcels the state acquired via eminent domain,
though some may have been.)
A few years later came the National Road—a new kind of federal project
that was treated the same way. Roads are a canonical example of the need for
eminent domain.129 There are a limited number of practical ways to connect the
destinations, and each individual right-of-way is valuable only if it can be
coupled with enough others to complete the road. Eminent domain can be
important to deal with holdouts. But when the federal government turned to
road building in the early years, it did so without relying on a federal eminent
domain power.
The National Road was one of the first major roads, and the first federally
constructed portion of it was known as the Cumberland Road, designed to run
west from Maryland to Vandalia, Illinois, and potentially to St. Louis or
beyond.130 From the beginning, the road was built only with state consent. The

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

129.

130.

Tender thereof being refused, the Fee and Property of such Lands shall vest in the United
States.” Id. at 12.
Act of Feb. 3, 1790, ch. 3, 1790 N.Y. Laws 106, 107.
Act of Nov. 16, 1790, ch. 321, 1790 N.J. Laws 669. The property was located in New Jersey.
1790 N.Y. Laws at 106 (locating the land “in the then Province now State of New Jersey”).
Act of Mar. 1, 1804, 1803 N.J. Laws 352.
Act of Feb. 14, 1791, 1791 N.H. Laws 374; An Act Granting to the United States of America
the Public Light-House Within This State, 1793 R.I. Pub. Laws 519.
See, e.g., Act of Apr. 18, 1795, 1794 Pa. Acts 757, 759 (giving title to the United States to
several hundred acres of land at the harbor of Presque Isle for “erect[ing] . . . and
maintain[ing] . . . forts, magazines, arsenals and dock-yards . . . thereon”).
See, e.g., William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the
Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 787 (“[R]oad-building [was] the most common
occasion in colonial America for the exercise of the eminent domain power.”).
See JEREMIAH SIMEON YOUNG, A POLITICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL STUDY OF THE
CUMBERLAND ROAD 20-30 (1904).
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bill authorizing construction of the Cumberland Road told President Jefferson
“to obtain consent for making the road, of the state or states, through which
the same has been laid out,” and authorized him to have the road built only
once he had done so.131 Maryland, Pennsylvania (after some debate about the
road’s path), and Virginia—the first three states along the road—all ultimately
consented.132
The federal legislation authorizing the road had not included any eminent
domain authority. But in the course of consenting to the road, the states
specifically authorized the road builders to use eminent domain under state
law. Pennsylvania authorized the President to open the road and gave the road
builders “full power and authority to enter upon the lands through which the
same may pass” and to take building materials from nearby lands, so long as
they compensated the owners according to state law.133 Virginia authorized the
road “to be cut out” and similarly gave the builders “full power and authority”
to lay down the road and take building materials under state law.134 Maryland’s
permission was more general, consenting “to the opening and improving the
same” and authorizing the President “to cause the said road to be laid out,
opened and improved, in such way and manner as by the before recited act of
[C]ongress is required and directed.”135 When it was needed,136 federal
construction of the road proceeded using the state’s eminent domain power.
A different practice obtained, however, when building roads in the District
of Columbia. The Constitution gave the power “to exercise exclusive
Legislation in all Cases whatsoever” over the District,137 and to “make all

131.

132.

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Act of Mar. 29, 1806, ch. 19, 2 Stat. 357, 358-59 (1806). Treasury Secretary Albert Gallatin
would later declare it “evident that the United States cannot, under the constitution, open
any road or canal, without the consent of the State through which such road or canal must
pass.” ALBERT GALLATIN, TREASURY DEP’T, ROADS AND CANALS, S. Misc. Doc. 10-250 (1808),
reprinted in 1 MISCELLANEOUS AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: MISCELLANEOUS 724, 741 (Wash.,
D.C., Gales & Seaton 1834). One study interprets Gallatin as “den[ying] any right of
eminent domain inhering in the United States.” LINDSAY ROGERS, THE POSTAL POWER OF
CONGRESS: A STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPANSION 66 (1916).
ARCHER BUTLER HULBERT, THE CUMBERLAND ROAD 53-54 (1904). On Pennsylvania’s
dithering, see LEONARD D. WHITE, THE JEFFERSONIANS: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE
HISTORY, 1801-1829, at 485 (1951); and YOUNG, supra note 130, at 40-41.
Act of Mar. 29, 1806, 1806 Pa. Laws 185, 185-86.
Act of Jan. 12, 1807, ch. 93, 1806 Va. Acts 36-37.
Act of Jan. 4, 1807, 1806 Md. Laws 39; see YOUNG, supra note 130, at 41 (characterizing
Maryland’s law, without citing it, as “of the same character” as Pennsylvania’s).
It often was not needed. Many landowners were “eager to do everything in their power to
assist in the construction of this improvement.” YOUNG, supra note 130, at 43.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
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needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory . . . belonging to the
United States.”138 The normal principle of enumerated powers gave way.
Indeed, the early Congress did authorize eminent domain in the District of
Columbia on a few occasions. In 1809, Congress passed a statute authorizing
the construction of a turnpike in Alexandria, which was then in the District of
Columbia.139 The statute authorized the turnpike company “to agree with the
owners of any ground to be occupied by the road,” or, “in case of
disagreement,” to condemn the road before a judge and twenty-four jurors
who would assess just compensation.140 Congress later authorized takings in
the District for the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal141 and for portions of the
Washington Aqueduct.142
We also know that at least one such condemnation actually occurred. In
1809, G.W.P. Custis came before the D.C. Circuit Court, asking it to review a
three-thousand-dollar award for his land that had been condemned for the
turnpike.143 (Presumably he thought the figure was too low.) Apparently
believing that some of the jurors were biased, the court agreed to quash the
inquisition, only to be unanimously reversed by the Supreme Court.144
Early federal takings in the territories appear to have been spottier, perhaps
because the federal government started out in possession of so much land. The
Indian tribes, of course, did have a prior claim to the land, but the dubious
combination of conquest and quasi-purchase145 may have been conceptually
different from eminent domain. Territorial legislatures did authorize eminent

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

144.
145.

Id. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
Act of Mar. 3, 1809, 2 Stat. 539.
Id. § 7, 2 Stat. at 541.
Chesapeake & Ohio Canal Co. v. Union Bank of Georgetown, 5 F. Cas. 570, 572 (C.C.D.D.C.
1830).
Act of Apr. 8, 1858, ch. 14, 11 Stat. 263.
Georgetown Tpk. Rd. Co. v. Custis, 10 F. Cas. 238, 238 (C.C.D.D.C. 1809), rev’d sub nom.
Custiss v. Georgetown & Alexandria Tpk. Co., 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 233. Judging by his
initials and the location of the case, G.W.P. Custis may have been George Washington
Parke Custis, the grandson of Martha (Custis) Washington and the father-in-law of Robert
E. Lee. Gregory C. Sisk, A Primer on the Doctrine of Federal Sovereign Immunity, 58 OKLA. L.
REV. 439, 447 (2005). If so, he was also the owner of the estate eventually at issue in the
now-canonical case of United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 198 (1882).
Custiss, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 237.
See generally STUART BANNER, HOW THE INDIANS LOST THEIR LAND: LAW AND POWER ON
THE FRONTIER (2005) (exploring the precise mechanisms by which the United States
acquired Indian land).
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domain for various projects during the antebellum period,146 and Congress did
later during the construction of the transcontinental railroad.147 Such takings
are unsurprising under the great powers theory.
Finally, it is worth noting how existing scholarship has misperceived the
early history. The author of the most substantial defense of federal eminent
domain, Adam Grace, contends that some members of the federal government
believed in a federal condemnation power during these early years, even if it
was not exercised. Grace focuses on Tench Coxe, then the Treasury’s
Commissioner of Revenue, who bought the land for the federal lighthouse at
Baker’s Island, where (as we have seen) state law authorized him to use
eminent domain.148 Grace relies on a letter Coxe wrote in 1797, in the course of
planning federal acquisition of a lighthouse in Newport, Rhode Island. Coxe’s
primary plan was to purchase the lighthouse—even if he had to pay “a liberal
price.”149 But at one point Coxe wrote to one of his subordinates that a backup
plan would be “taking measures to procure the land upon a just valuation of a
Jury under the authority of law, in that manner which is understood to be
called ‘condemning land’ in the Eastern states.”150 Grace claims that “there was
no Rhode Island statute authorizing or consenting to a condemnation
proceeding by the United States”151 and infers from that that “Coxe did not
view state consent as a prerequisite to federal exercise of eminent domain
power.”152
Whatever weight one gives to a couple of private letters, Grace’s view of
Coxe’s actions is mistaken. There was a Rhode Island statute authorizing
condemnation proceedings in Newport, if the United States offered the
appraised value of the land and “upon the Tender thereof being refused.”153
Granted, the statute applied only to “such Lands as shall be deemed necessary

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

152.
153.

See, e.g., Ryerson v. Brown, 35 Mich. 332, 344 (1877) (discussing territorial history);
Newcomb v. Smith, 2 Pin. 131, 132-35 (Wis. 1849) (same).
See infra notes 234-247, 272-277 and accompanying text.
Grace, supra note 5, at 144-45. Coxe had promised that states would retain “lordship of the
soil.” Coxe, supra note 95, at 51.
Grace, supra note 5, at 146 n.167 (quoting Letter from Tench Coxe to William Ellery (Feb.
28, 1797) (on file with Nat’l Archives & Records Admin.)).
Id. at 145 (quoting Letter from Tench Coxe to William Ellery, supra note 149).
Id. at 146. Grace quotes similar statements by Coxe’s successor, William Miller, at least one
of which is a reference to New Jersey’s use of eminent domain, discussed supra note 126.
Grace, supra note 5, at 146-47.
Id. at 146.
Act of Mar. 1794, 1794 R.I. Acts & Resolves 11, 12; see supra note 123 (discussing this law).
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to erect Fortifications upon,”154 which might not include the land that already
held the Newport Lighthouse, but the statute shows how the Rhode Island
legislature could have transferred the Newport Lighthouse as well. Indeed,
Coxe’s reference to the procedure “in the ‘Eastern States’” seems to hint at state
procedures. So by “taking measures,” Coxe may well have meant procuring the
passage of another condemnation statute; after all, at the time there was no
existing federal statutory authority for a condemnation either.
Similar ambiguity—at best—attends a late message from President
Jefferson to Congress which Grace relies on.155 In March 1808, Jefferson
lamented that sometimes “the sites most advantageous” for fortifying the
country’s harbors belonged to minors, to people who refused to sell, or to
people who “demand a compensation far beyond the liberal justice allowable in
such cases.”156 Noting the need for “defense of our seaboard,” Jefferson
declared:
I submit the case to the consideration of Congress, who, estimating its
importance and reviewing the powers vested in them by the
Constitution, combined with the amendment providing that private
property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation,
will decide on the course most proper to be pursued.157
Grace suggests that, in this message, “Jefferson pointed [Congress] to [its]
power to take property with just compensation,” but the message is really quite
equivocal.158 Jefferson poses the problem as something for Congress to figure
out the answer to, but he does not say what that answer might be. Maybe upon
constitutional reflection the solution would have been special legislation for
contracting with legally incompetent property holders, or further use of state
condemnations, or just larger appropriations. The most we can say is that
Jefferson asked Congress to consider whether there was such a power, and to
use it if there was. For what it is worth, Congress did not propose eminent
domain; the message was referred to a Senate committee and seems to have

154.
155.
156.

157.
158.

1794 R.I. Acts & Resolves 11.
See Grace, supra note 5, at 147 n.171; see also CURRIE, supra note 5, at 122 n.254 (citing this
message).
Thomas Jefferson, To the Senate and House of Representative of the United States, in 1 A
COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, 1789-1897, at 435, 435
(James D. Richardson ed., Bureau of Nat’l Literature, Inc. [c. 1908]) (1897).
Id.
Grace, supra note 5, at 147 n.171.
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died there.159 The next year Jefferson sent Congress a report on his progress in
fortifying the harbors, including Georgia, where he had “obtained with great
difficulty” private property near Savannah.160 Yet this time, the report only
asked for money.
Finally, Grace argues that conceptually these state takings ought to be seen
as federal takings, at least where the taking proceeded by authorizing the
federal government or agents to proceed rather than taking the land itself and
then transferring it.161 Grace’s characterization, however, is anachronistic and
mistaken. There is no evidence that the form of the taking for federal purposes
was thought relevant. When states authorized private corporations to take land
for public uses, for example, that was ultimately an exercise of state power.162
So this is not an example, as Grace puts it, of states’ “consensually expand[ing]
the federal government’s powers under the Constitution,”163 but rather of a
federal plaintiff pursuing a nonfederal cause of action.164
B. Roads, Again
The possibility of using federal eminent domain was explicitly floated, and
ultimately rejected, when Congress returned to dealing with the Cumberland
Road in 1818.165 Speaker of the House Henry Clay, a strong proponent of
federal development of internal improvements, argued that Congress had the
power “to fell the oak of the mountain, to gather the stone which has slept for
centuries useless in its bosom, and therewith construct roads—with the
qualification . . . that, when the Government takes private property, it is bound
to make compensation therefor.”166 This seems to have been a claim to federal
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See 17 ANNALS OF CONG. 175 (1808).
Report of Henry Dearborn enclosed in Thomas Jefferson, Fortifications (Jan. 6, 1809),
reprinted in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: MILITARY AFFAIRS 236, 237 (Wash., D.C., Gales &
Seaton 1832).
Grace, supra note 5, at 151, 153 n.194.
See, e.g., Gilmer v. Lime Point, 18 Cal. 229, 251 (1861) (collecting earlier sources).
Grace, supra note 5, at 153 n.194.
See, e.g., Bank of the U.S. v. Planters’ Bank of Ga., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 904 (1824) (suit by
federal entity upon nonfederal claim).
Jeremiah Young attributed the new arguments in favor of eminent domain to “the
nationalizing tendencies which followed the War of 1812.” YOUNG, supra note 130, at 41.
McCulloch v. Maryland was argued and decided the following year.
31 ANNALS OF CONG. 1169 (1818).
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eminent domain.167
While Clay was an aggressive advocate, there were forceful responses.
Opponents argued that the federal government had no such power,
questioning whether “any of the framers of the Constitution could ever have
imagined . . . that the power to . . . lay open the enclosures of individuals for
roads, from one end of the State to the other, without their consent . . . passed
into the hands of Congress by implication,”168 and proclaiming that “the
appropriation of the soil . . . belong[s] exclusively to the States.”169 Ultimately,
the nays had it. Eminent domain was not used in the later extensions of the
road, and Congress declined a proposal that it explicitly affirm the existence of
the eminent domain power.170
The naysayers were reaffirmed again a few years later, when President
Monroe vetoed a bill to establish tollgates on the road.171 There are several
constitutional puzzles in the veto message. Monroe argued that Congress had
no power to establish internal improvements but also wanted a theory that
could justify the Cumberland Road, since it already existed and he apparently
regarded it as a sort of precedent.172 Monroe came up with a broad theory of
the spending power. But what is interesting for our purposes is what he said in
the course of explaining that theory. Monroe insisted that, while Congress
could appropriate money for “many very important natural purposes,” the
“condemnation of the land, if the proprietors should refuse to sell it, the
establishment of turnpikes and tolls, and the protection of the work when
finished must be done by the State.”173 Congress had not attempted to exercise
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169.
170.
171.
172.

173.

See id. at 1207 (statement of Rep. Archibald Austin) (characterizing as Clay’s argument that
it was “in the power of the Postmaster General . . . to take possession of any house or lot of
land, in town or country, for the post office, and that, contrary to the will of the owner, as
being an incidental power necessary to the Post Office Establishment”).
32 id. at 1351-52 (1818) (statement of Rep. James Pindall); see also 31 id. at 1209-10 (1818)
(statement of Rep. Archibald Austin).
40 id. at 709 (1823) (statement of Rep. Silas Wood).
See YOUNG, supra note 130, at 42.
See WHITE, supra note 3, at 253-54 (discussing the trend of tollgates on the National Road
and elsewhere).
See CURRIE, supra note 5, at 280-81 (explaining Monroe’s attempt to distinguish the
Cumberland Road and contrasting him with Madison, who regarded it as “sui generis or
unconstitutional”).
James Monroe, Views of the President of the United States on the Subject of Internal
Improvements (May 4, 1822), in 2 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE
PRESIDENTS 713, 736-37 (James D. Richardson ed., 1897) [hereinafter COMPILATION]. The
“views” were an addendum to his brief veto message for the Cumberland Road. James
Monroe, Veto Message (May 4, 1822), in 2 COMPILATION, supra, 711, 711-12. Monroe
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eminent domain in the bill.
The same pattern of using state eminent domain for federal projects
recurred after Monroe’s veto message, when Maryland authorized a slight
change in the path of the road. The Maryland legislature explicitly authorized
federal agents to move the road, and “to condemn, if refused, by the course of
proceedings provided” by state law.174 As the National Road went further west,
“it reached states in which the United States owned land,” acquired back when
the states were territories.175 Less attention was paid to other road projects, but
they seem to have followed the same pattern.176 Ultimately, federal eminent
domain was rejected during this period.
Again, the existing scholarship misperceives what happened here. Grace
states that there was “a single instance of a federal taking involving a property
owner affected by construction of the Cumberland Road.”177 But this is wrong;
there were none. Grace is referring to the repeated petitions of John Good,
whose land was taken for the road by Virginia, not the federal government.178
(Good, incidentally, was upset that he was not paid compensation, but that
was because appraisers had concluded that the road increased his property
value, and Good had skipped out on the hearing where he could have contested
that conclusion.179)
David Currie also briefly discusses the eminent domain issue in one of his
books on constitutional debate in Congress. He suggests that Clay’s arguments
were correct even though they did not carry the day.180 But Currie does not
discuss earlier views of the Necessary and Proper Clause—including the
arguments under which eminent domain might have been thought not to be an
implicit power—nor the following decades of historical practice. Currie also
remarks on a one-paragraph House report issued a decade later which declined
to recommend any legislation on takings as “inexpedient.”181 Currie describes
this report as “implicitly recognizing the existence of federal power to condemn
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apparently sent it to the Justices of the Supreme Court. Norman R. Williams, Gibbons, 79
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1398, 1455 (2004).
YOUNG, supra note 130, at 43 (quoting 1832 Md. Laws, at lxvii).
Id.
Id. at 44-45.
Grace, supra note 5, at 150 (citing 40 ANNALS OF CONG. 620 (1823)).
See 40 ANNALS OF CONG. 620 (1823) (“A gentleman, his name, I think, was Good . . . .”);
H.R. REP. NO. 19-140, at 2-3 (1826) (detailing Good’s petitions).
H.R. REP. NO. 19-140, at 3 (“The petitioner was duly notified of the time and place of the
meeting of these persons thus appointed, and declined to attend . . . .”).
CURRIE, supra note 5, at 277.
H.R. REP. NO. 20-90 (1828).
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property.”182 But the heading of the report asked “under what rules and
regulations private property (if to be taken at all) shall be taken for public
use.”183 In other words, the report can be read as agnostic about the existence of
a federal power—and especially as to whether that power would be exercised
outside of the District and territories, and without state authorization.184
C. The Supreme Court
A decade after these debates over internal improvements, there continued
to be occasional comments in favor of a general federal eminent domain
power—but in addition to being quite late, those comments were not actually
put into practice or judicial holding. For example, in discussing the Enclaves
Clause in his 1833 Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, Joseph
Story asked:
Suppose a state should prohibit a sale of any of the lands within its
boundaries by its own citizens, for any public purposes indispensable
for the Union, either military or civil, would not congress possess a
constitutional right to demand, and appropriate land within the state
for such purposes, making a just compensation?185
Another mention of federal power was an 1838 dictum by the Kentucky
Supreme Court, in a case about whether a contractor carrying the U.S. mail
was thereby exempted from tolls on a Kentucky road. No, said the court,
adding that “[Congress] can not appropriate private property to public use
without either the consent of the owner, or the payment of a just compensation
for the property, or for the use of it.”186 But this broad view was not taken by
somebody with the power to do anything about it.187
When the Supreme Court did finally confront the issue, in the 1845
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CURRIE, supra note 5, at 312 n.188.
H.R. REP. NO. 20-90 (emphasis added).
The failed bill to authorize federal eminent domain some thirty years later, for example, still
required the consent of the state. See infra notes 224-232 and accompanying text.
3 STORY, supra note 109, § 1141, at 46.
Dickey v. Maysville, Wash., Paris & Lexington Tpk. Rd. Co., 37 Ky. (7 Dana) 113, 113-14
(1838); see also id. at 113, 113 editor’s note (“[U]nless Congress shall elect to exert its right of
eminent domain, and buy a State road, or make one or help to make or repair it, the
constitution gives no authority to use it as a post road, without the consent of the State, or
owner or without making a just compensation for the use.” (emphasis added)).
See ROGERS, supra note 131, at 87 (“Here was acknowledgment of an authority more far
reaching than even the more liberal contemporary opinion gave to Congress.”).
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submerged-lands case of Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan, it reinforced the dominant
view of eminent domain power. The Court was asked to determine the
ownership of a riverfront plot of land in Mobile, Alabama.188 Congress had
purported to grant the land to the Pollards, but the grant was after Alabama’s
admission as a state, and the land was arguably underwater. This thrust the
Court into the cessions and ordinances that had resulted in Alabama’s
statehood, as well as into the principles of federal land governance. As the
Court put it, “To a correct understanding of the rights, powers, and duties of
the parties to these contracts, it is necessary to enter into a more minute
examination of the rights of eminent domain, and the right to the public
lands.”189
The Court then explained the federal government’s eminent domain
power: “The right which belongs to the society, or to the sovereign, of
disposing, in case of necessity, and for the public safety, of all the wealth
contained in the state, is called the eminent domain.”190 And that power
necessarily fell to Alabama:
When Alabama was admitted into the union, on an equal footing with
the original states, she succeeded to all the rights of sovereignty,
jurisdiction, and eminent domain which Georgia possessed at the date
of the cession, except so far as this right was diminished by the public
lands remaining in the possession and under the control of the United
States, for the temporary purposes provided for in the deed of cession
and the legislative acts connected with it. Nothing remained to the
United States, according to the terms of the agreement, but the public
lands. And, if an express stipulation had been inserted in the
agreement, granting the municipal right of sovereignty and eminent
domain to the United States, such stipulation would have been void
and inoperative; because the United States have no constitutional
capacity to exercise municipal jurisdiction, sovereignty, or eminent
domain, within the limits of a state or elsewhere, except in the cases in
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For background on the land, see City of Mobile v. Emanuel, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 95 (1843). For
attempts to summarize the extensive litigation, see 5 CARL B. SWISHER, HISTORY OF THE
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which it is expressly granted.191
That last clause (“expressly granted”) might seem a little puzzling, and the
Court went on to explain it in the next paragraph. It noted that the
Constitution—in the District Clause—did grant the federal government “the
national and municipal powers of government, of every description,” but that
this Clause and that of the “temporary territorial governments” were “the only
cases, within the United States, in which all the powers of government are
united in a single government.”192 In other words, eminent domain was a
power that had to be “expressly granted” by the Constitution, not found by
implication, and the District and Territories Clauses were the only places the
Constitution expressly granted the power.
Interestingly, Justice Story, then in his last year of service,193 did not
dissent, even though he had speculated in his Commentaries on the Constitution
that the federal government might have an eminent domain power.194 Justice
Catron dissented; but he did not seem to object to the eminent domain ruling,
so much as the facts of Pollard’s title itself. Justice Catron pointed out that in
previous litigation about the same grant, he had written a unanimous opinion
concluding that Pollard’s title had been reserved and confirmed by an 1836 Act
of Congress.195 The previous decisions, however, had “decided interstitial
questions without reaching the question of constitutional power.”196
In any event, Justice Catron did not object when the Court reaffirmed its
view of eminent domain five years later in yet another case in the same saga,
Goodtitle v. Kibbe.197 Once more, the Court explained, the United States could
not “grant or confirm a title to land when the sovereignty and dominion over it
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Id. at 223-34.
The Court decided Pollard’s Lessee in January 1845. 44 U.S. (3 How.) at 213. Justice Story
died on September 10, 1845. See Fed. Judicial Ctr., Story, Joseph, BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY
OF FED. JUDGES, http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=2302 (last visited Dec. 2, 2012);
Proceedings of Court Had upon the Death of Judge Story, in 45 U.S. (4 How.) at v. His son
reports that Justice Story remained quite able until early September, when he finished
writing his last circuit court opinions. See 2 LIFE AND LETTERS OF JOSEPH STORY 546
(William W. Story ed., Boston, Little Brown 1851) (“No judgments delivered by him, are
more clear, able, and elaborate than these . . . .”).
See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
See Pollard’s Lessee, 44 U.S. (3 How.) at 230-31 (Catron, J., dissenting) (citing Pollard’s Heirs
v. Kibbe, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 353 (1840); Pollard v. Files, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 591 (1844)); see also
Whittington, supra note 188, at 1313-14 (summarizing Pollard and Pollard’s Lessee).
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had become vested in the State.”198
At least one treatise writer agreed with this approach. Isaac Redfield, the
Chief Justice of Vermont and “the nation’s leading authority on railroad
law,”199 denied the federal eminent domain power in his treatise on railways:
[I]t would seem, that notwithstanding this right of sovereignty may
reside in the United States, as the paramount sovereign, so far as the
territories are concerned, in reference to internal communication, by
highways and railways, and notwithstanding the ownership of the soil
of a portion of the lands, by the United States, in many of the States, as
well as territories, still when any of the territories are admitted into the
Union, as independent States, the general rights of eminent domain are
vested exclusively in the State sovereignty.200
Thus, in 1845, the Supreme Court had laid out exactly the theory of
eminent domain advanced in this Article. For nearly thirty years, not only
political practice, but also judicial precedent, made clear that the federal
government could use eminent domain only in places where it had the powers
of a local government. In the states, the federal government needed state
cooperation.
D. Continuing Cooperative Takings
The traditional pattern continued for decades more. States continued to
condemn land for federal projects, and the federal government continued not
to even attempt any federal condemnations. This was true even as the joint
takings scheme became quite complicated, and was no more convenient than a
direct federal taking would have been.
One mid-century case that gives a good sense of the complications is that of
the Washington Aqueduct. In 1852, the relatively new city of Washington was
thirsty.201 Congress passed a pair of statutes appropriating a hefty sum (more

198.
199.
200.

201.

Id. at 478.
David M. Gold, Redfield, Railroads, and the Roots of “Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism,” 27 AM. J.
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1 ISAAC F. REDFIELD, A PRACTICAL TREATISE UPON THE LAW OF RAILWAYS 113 (Boston, Little
Brown & Co. 185[7]). The discussion is quoted in Gilmer v. Lime Point, 18 Cal. 229, 252
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it. See infra note 285.
See generally HARRY C. WAYS, THE WASHINGTON AQUEDUCT, 1852-1992 [1996] (providing
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than one hundred thousand dollars) to the President to figure out how to
obtain “an unfailing and abundant supply of good and wholesome water.”202
The solution was an aqueduct, drawing water from the neighboring state of
Maryland. The federal government did not own the land or buy it from the
private owners, and “[n]early all of the property had to be condemned.”203 As
had become traditional, Maryland condemned the land, and then offered it all
up to the federal government.204
Legal wrangling ensued. Attorney General Caleb Cushing had signed off
on the project, concluding that it likely satisfied both federal and state law.205
But the owner challenged the taking in the Maryland courts, where attorney
John Tyson complained that “this little State” was “[s]o eager . . . to surrender
to ‘The Monster Republic’ her precious right of eminent domain.”206
The issues were not obvious. First, there were questions of Maryland law:
the appellant’s principal state-law argument was that Maryland could take land
through eminent domain “only for the uses of the public of Maryland,”207 not to
give or to sell to the Capital. There was also a wrinkle having to do with the
municipal structure of the District. At the time, the City of Washington was
only one of several cities inside the District of Columbia, and the appellant
complained that the water would go only to locals in the City of Washington
rather than to the District as a whole.208
Then there was federal law: Tyson argued that Congress had no
enumerated “power to purchase lands or water power in another State, for the
construction of an aqueduct for the use of the city of Washington.”209 Now, in
the end, all was well for the aqueduct. The Maryland courts found the taking
perfectly lawful under state and federal law,210 and the Supreme Court
dismissed the ensuing appeal for lack of jurisdiction.211 But the state-law
arguments were not frivolous, and if the federal government had an eminent
domain power, the whole scheme was extremely roundabout.
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Act of Aug. 31, 1852, ch. 108, 10 Stat. 76, 92; see Act of Mar. 3, 1853, ch. 97, 10 Stat. 189, 206.
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Yet despite the legal challenges that it entailed, the roundabout scheme was
relatively common. In 1859, the State of California passed a statute authorizing
federal agents to seize “any tract of land, and the right of way thereto . . . for the
erection of a light-house, beacon light, range-light, fortifications, navy-yard, or
other military or naval purposes” from anybody who could not or would not
sell them.212 Once more, the owner challenged the statute as a subversion of
state and federal principles of public use. The California Supreme Court
upheld the statute. It first explained that the statute relied on California’s
eminent domain power, and it then explained the reason for this roundabout
process: “When any of the Territories are admitted into the Union as
independent States, the general rights of eminent domain are vested exclusively
in the State sovereignty.”213
As with the Washington Aqueduct, the taking was challenged for lack of a
public use under the state’s constitution. The state’s “power . . . to take being
unquestionable, and the State being, as the local sovereign, the proper
authority by whom this power is to be usually exercised, it devolves upon the
respondents to show that the particular case made by this record is an
exception to the general power.”214 And the landowners could show no such
“exception.” It was hard to dispute that a fort was a public use, leaving the
landowners holding on to the argument that the taking was unconstitutional
because it was a public use for the entire country, and not just for the citizens
of California. That argument was rejected just as it had been in Maryland.215
There are other examples throughout the prewar period. In 1856, the
United States wished to acquire a lighthouse from one Colonel Seabrook, who
“refuse[d] to sell” it.216 South Carolina passed a law taking the property from
him and selling it to the federal government. Attorney General Cushing
concluded that the exercise of eminent domain was valid.217 In 1847, the New
York legislature authorized the taking of land near Long Island for the United
States to build a lighthouse.218
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The lack of a federal condemnation power also came up in the discussion of
land titles. When Cushing endorsed the federal-state takings partnership for
the Washington Aqueduct, he had not squarely addressed the federal
government’s power of eminent domain. But on another occasion, he did,
when asked whether the federal government could use eminent domain to clear
up a tangle of land titles in the part of Texas that would become Fort Brown.
Cushing said no: “[S]uch a sovereign right, if existing, would belong to the
new sovereign power of the country, namely the State of Texas, not the United
States.”219 When Texas was admitted to the Union, it held “[t]he right of
eminent domain . . . by title anterior to, and of course independent of, its
accession to the Union.”220 And even if Texas had been a territory—and
therefore temporarily subject to plenary federal power—“still the [right of]
eminent domain of its own territory would pass to it on its admission into the
Union, in virtue of the inherent equality of the several States.”221
E. The 1860s
Accounts differ as to exactly when the first federal takings began. Kohl itself
declared that “[i]t is true, this power of the Federal government has not
heretofore been exercised adversely,”222 and most sources take it at its word. A
few scattered sources purport to have identified examples of federal eminent
domain during the 1860s, though not always the same ones.223 Ultimately, the
results were mixed. At the beginning of the decade, and even after the
Southern states seceded and left Congress, there was still a decisive opposition
to a federal eminent domain power. By the end of the 1860s, Congress had
authorized the first few federal condemnations in Civil War-related contexts,
but it is not clear whether all of these condemnations were performed or if the
land was sometimes obtained voluntarily. And even as these condemnations
were authorized, Congress continued to demonstrate doubts about the power.
The decade thus marked the beginning of a change in the previously uniform
federal practice, but not the full culmination of that change. Let us see how
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things began and ended.
In 1860, the Senate Judiciary Committee reported a proposed statute to
exercise federal eminent domain. It had gone nowhere two years earlier,224 but
its proponents made the case. All takings would require state consent, which
was “exceedingly well guarded,” in the words of one of the bill’s proponents.225
“That is a very necessary point, and I am glad it is guarded,” agreed Jefferson
Davis, a skeptic of the bill, but it was not enough for him—takings ought to be
done “under a law enacted by the State,” he said, which was what the Framers
had anticipated (“Hence the expressions of the Constitution are very
guarded.”).226 Davis also acknowledged that the Takings Clause appeared to
presuppose some form of eminent domain power, but speculated that it was
for personal property (“such as a transport ship”), not “real estate within the
limits of a State.”227
The discussion continued, with the proponents insisting repeatedly that
the state consent clause “fully guarded” states’ interests.228 (One of the bill’s
authors was Judah Benjamin, Jefferson Davis’s future Attorney General and
Secretary of War and State.229) But others complained that that was not
enough: Louis Wigfall of Texas gave a long speech against the “extraordinary”
contention that the federal government had an eminent domain power,
recalling that President Monroe had argued against it230 and that “from that
time to this I have understood that to be the known and well-settled doctrine
of the Republican party.”231 James Mason of Virginia agreed, arguing that
while the Necessary and Proper Clause gave the federal government “incidental
powers” to obtain land, it “must go into the States as an ordinary purchaser.”232
Even the state consent clause was not enough for the skeptics. The bill was
held over, and died later that session.233
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Nor was it only Southerners who expressed reservations about federal
eminent domain during this period. Indeed, even after secession, members of
the Union Congress displayed the same concerns, beginning with a railroad
bill. Railroad construction in the states had so far proceeded using
state-chartered corporations, which possessed eminent domain as a matter of
state law,234 with the federal government sometimes involved through federal
land grants.235
In 1862, Congress confronted a bill to move this process to the federal
level—creating a federal railroad corporation to build parts of the
transcontinental railroad. As first proposed, the bill would have authorized the
Union Pacific to build the railroad from Kansas to California. Though the
Southerners were gone by this point, Representative Thaddeus Stevens
(really!) raised federalism objections in the House: “I do not desire that this
corporation shall have the power of locating the road the whole way through
the States.”236 Stevens proposed an amendment that limited the federal charter
and federal powers to the territories. Doing so, Stevens said, “avoids that
difficulty by authorizing certain companies incorporated by the States to make
the road through those States, and then the company itself is to make the road
through the Territories, through the public lands.”237
The amendment was motivated by constitutional concerns. “I do not
know,” Stevens said, “that I share in the doubt as to the constitutionality of the
United States incorporating companies to make railroads through the States;
but I know that it is entertained by a large number of people.”238 Limiting the
bill to the territories would “do away with the constitutional objection to this
bill, which, I admit, is a serious one, and may affect many minds unless we
forget all our old lessons.”239
David Currie puzzles over this objection, wondering why Stevens—or
anybody—would have questioned the constitutionality of a federal corporation,
which as “Chief Justice Marshall had patiently explained in McCulloch v
Maryland, was a perfectly ordinary, necessary, and proper means of carrying
out the various powers granted to Congress.”240 After McCulloch, Currie notes,
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“the ostensible constitutional question was not serious after all. But Congress
for some reason remained skittish.”241 Currie misunderstands Stevens’s
objections, which were not about the corporate form as such. They were about
a railroad corporation, and the eminent domain issue explains why: railroad
corporations had the power to take and build roads through private property,
which had previously been exercised by the states.
A later colloquy about the bill makes it even clearer that the objection was
based on eminent domain. Senator Trumbull explained that he, too, supported
the territorial limitation: “I think it is a very serious question whether the
Government of the United States has authority to charter a company to build a
railroad in a State of this Union.”242 Why? Because,
if the United States have a right to charter a company to build a road in
Kansas, they have a right to condemn the lands there, and they may
take possession of all our railroads. If the Government of the United
States may do this, they may, under their paramount right of eminent
domain, go into the State of New York and condemn the New York
Central railroad, and make it a Government road; and so with any
other railroad in the United States.243
Senator Lot Morrill of Maine had the same objection. The bill could not
extend to land “in sovereign and independent States, over which, of course, the
United States has no power and no right to grant a right of way.”244 In state
territory, “whatever legislation Congress may propose, must be proposed in
conjunction with the legislation of those States.”245 (“Over the Territories, of
course, Congress has jurisdiction and may grant the right of way,” Morrill
allowed.246) The Union Pacific bill was signed into law by President Lincoln,
limited to the territories.247
Things started to change, a little, in 1864. Two years earlier, Congress had
passed a bill providing for a federal arsenal in Rock Island, Illinois.248 A local
petition had urged the federal government to pick the site, noting an
“important consideration in favor of Rock Island . . . is that the government
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owns the site.”249 There had been a few squatters, but they had since been
prosecuted, and an Illinois official certified that the land was clear.250
Apparently that was not quite true, however. Congress had granted two
gentlemen minor land interests,251 and in 1864 Vice President Johnson came
before Congress to ask that the Secretary of War be authorized to purchase—or
else condemn—their claims.252
Senator Hale of New Hampshire called a halt. The bill “involves a new
principle in the practice of this Government . . . . I think there has been no
instance of an attempt on the part of this Government to take private property
in a State for public uses against the consent of the owner.”253 He asked Senator
Howard (“who I know is a profound lawyer”) to speak to the question.254
Senator Howard said not to worry. First of all, “it is a small island,” which
except for one hundred ninety acres “belongs entirely to the United
States . . . and no controversy can arise so far as is now seen under this bill,
except as to that portion of the land which is now owned by private persons,
those persons being only two in number.”255 And in any case, said Howard, the
bill was constitutional. Interestingly, he did not refer to the Necessary and
Proper Clause but rather to the Fifth Amendment:
[T]he Constitution, by the plainest implication, authorizes the
Government of the United States, whenever they shall see fit to take
private property for the public use, to do so upon making just
compensation. This is in one of the amendments to the Constitution
adopted after the main body of the Constitution had been in operation
for several years.256
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In any case, Howard added, an aggrieved party had the right to appeal to the
circuit courts and then to the Supreme Court, “so that I am not able to see any
objection to the bill growing out of the suspicion of injustice being done to any
private person.”257
A few moments of debate began. There was confusion about whether
Illinois had consented to the acquisition (“I do not know how that is,” Howard
answered).258 There was confusion about whether Illinois’s consent was
relevant to the taking or only to the Enclaves Clause.259 And there was
confusion about the power to take: Senator Johnson argued that even without
the Fifth Amendment, the eminent domain power was “an incident of
sovereignty,” and that the power had been exercised before, referring to the
Lime Point taking,260 though another senator correctly pointed out that those
“proceedings were in a State court under a State law.”261 Johnson and Howard
replied again, but before things could proceed much further, Senator Trumbull
and Senator Foot, the presiding officer, intervened. It was apparent that the
Rock Island bill was “to lead to discussion,” but it was after 1:00 PM, and it
was time for “the special order of the day” (an urgent military funding bill).262
If further discussion about the Rock Island bill ever came, though, it was
not recorded in the pages of the Globe. Late in the morning three days later,
Senator Howard pushed for a vote again, but Senator Fessenden objected that
they did not have time: “Of course there will be debate on that. There was the
other day,” overriding Howard’s claim that it would “be but a very short
debate.”263 Three days later, the bill was considered again, and passed. But if
there was a discussion, the Globe does not disclose it.264 President Lincoln
signed the bill on April 22, 1864, thus ushering in the first official authorization
of federal eminent domain.265 It is not clear whether the taking ever
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happened.266
But things still remained unsettled after that, as the Senate turned back to
railroads. The bulk of the debate centered on amendments to the Union Pacific
Railroad bill, whose charter was (recall) limited to the territories.267 Howard,
once again, was the one to push for an extension of the power into the states.
Senator Pomeroy objected that “under the decision that we made in the last
Congress . . . Congress could not incorporate a company that should run one
foot of road in a State except by the permission of the laws of that State or the
consent of the Legislature of that State.”268 Harlan noted that the position had
been “insisted here by some of the best lawyers in the country, two years ago,”
and that “a question that has been thus settled after long and protracted
discussion in both branches of Congress ought to remain so,” evidently not
thinking that the Rock Island arsenal bill had unsettled the railroad
question.269
Senator Howard insisted, as he had days before, that there was a general
federal eminent domain power:
I hold, and I think there can be no dissent from that principle, that the
United States has the same power of eminent domain over the lands
lying within a State for the purpose of constructing a railroad in order
to carry out the objects of a corporation as is possessed by the State, and
I have in my mind not the slightest difficulty as to the power of the
Government to seize and to condemn the lands of private persons lying
within a State for such a purpose.270
This time, however, there was dissent, and his amendment to extend the
federal takings power into the states was defeated.271 The final Union Pacific
Bill did not alter the territorial limitation of the original legislation.272
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There was another railroad bill before the Thirty-Eighth Congress, which
dealt with a line from Lake Superior (through the states of Minnesota or
Wisconsin) west to Puget Sound. The first draft of the bill apparently
“involve[d] nothing more than a grant of lands,”273 and steamed through
without much recorded discussion.274 At some point, though, the federal
company did gain eminent domain powers.275 In light of the fact that the
company was to build a route through at least one state, this seems
inconsistent with the treatment of the Union Railroad. It is possible, however,
that eminent domain was needed only for the territorial portion of the route,
since there were adequate land grants in the states. While the bill does not
quite say this, the section dealing with eminent domain refers to adjudication
by a “court of record in any of the territories in which the lands or premises to
be taken lie.”276 The bill also required the company to “obtain the consent of
the legislature of any state through which any portion of said railroad line may
pass, previous to commencing the construction thereof,” which may have been
intended to cure the problem.277 Or maybe, after Rock Island, nobody was
being too careful.
On balance it is not clear whether either 1864 railroad bill authorized
federal eminent domain in the states, but the Rock Island bill did, even if it is
not quite clear why. Over the next few years, there were a few other sporadic
authorizations of the power. For example, an 1866 bill authorized eminent
domain for a federal railroad company to build a route from Missouri to the
Pacific, though as with the Puget Sound bill, there were textual clues that the
takings may have been targeted for the territories.278 An 1867 bill authorized
the Secretary of War to purchase or condemn land for national cemeteries,279
and it may have been used at least once a few years later.280 But the federal
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CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2664 (1864) (statement of Sen. James McDougall).
What little there is can be found at id. at 3290-91. See also id. at 3360, 3459, 3482 (noting,
though not reporting, a conference with the House over amendments).
Act of July 2, 1864, ch. 217, § 7, 13 Stat. 365, 369-70.
Id. (emphasis added); see also id. (referring to “persons residing without the territory within
which the lands to be taken lie”).
Id. § 18; accord ROGERS, supra note 131, at 91.
Act of July 27, 1866, ch. 278, 14 Stat. 292.
Act of Feb. 22, 1867, ch. 61, § 5, 14 Stat. 399, 400. The bill was originally limited to the
District and “the States lately in rebellion,” CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 540 (1867),
but was expanded nationwide without discussion of the constitutional question.
See Nat’l Cemetery at Grafton, 14 Op. Att’y Gen. 27 (1872) (noting that land was appraised
by a district court, though the “appraisal seemed to the War Department exorbitant” and
was under dispute).
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power was not used consistently. In 1868, for example, Congress passed a bill
for construction near rapids on the Mississippi River, and authorized federal
officers to take land only under the existing state law procedures.281 A few years
later, the issue once again reached the courts, and this time they took a
decidedly different view than they had in Pollard’s Lessee.
F. The Growth of Modern Doctrine
The sporadic authorization of federal takings for an arsenal and for military
cemeteries did not change the law by itself, of course. Even after those statutes,
Congress still frequently relied on the old system.282 But judicial decisions soon
thereafter endorsed a federal eminent domain power.
One blow to the old system was the Michigan Supreme Court’s 1871
decision in Trombley v. Humphrey. Writing for the court, Justice Cooley held
that a state taking for a federal project was not a taking for a “public use” under
that state’s constitution.283 This was the objection that had been made by the
challengers to the Washington Aqueduct and the other projects—that a state
can take private property only for the use of the state’s own people, not for the
government generally. Justice Cooley may have been motivated by a narrow
construction of the public use doctrine—his writings on the subject have been
celebrated by modern critics who favor a revival of limits on the public use
doctrine284—but he had also endorsed federal eminent domain in a confusing
passage in his famous treatise a few years earlier.285
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Act of Feb. 22, 1867, ch. 184, 15 Stat. 124 (1868). One of the bill’s proponents explained that
its purpose was “merely to enable the officers . . . to avail themselves of the benefit of the
laws of Iowa and Illinois.” CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 692 (1868) (statement of
Rep. James Wilson).
In addition to the discussion supra Section II.E, see, for example, Act of Mar. 3, 1878, ch. 311,
17 Stat. 621; Burt v. Merchants’ Insurance Co., 106 Mass. 356, 358-59 (1871); Orr v. Quimby, 54
N.H. 590, 591 (1874); and In re League Island, 1 Brewster’s Reports 524, 524-25 (Pa. Ct. Com.
Pl. 1868).
People ex rel. Trombley v. Humphrey, 23 Mich. 471, 481 (1871).
See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 513 n.2 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting);
Cnty. of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 789-91, 797-98 (Mich. 2004) (Weaver, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); James W. Ely, Jr., Thomas Cooley, “Public Use,”
and New Directions in Takings Jurisprudence, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 845, 857. But see Richard
A. Epstein, The Public Use, Public Trust & Public Benefit: Could Both Cooley & Kelo Be
Wrong?, 9 GREEN BAG 2d 125, 131 (2006) (“Cooley was wrong, I think, but principled.”).
Justice Cooley declared that “eminent domain . . . itself, it would seem, must pertain to [the
states], rather than to the government of the nation; and such has been the decision of the
courts.” THOMAS M. COOLEY, ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON
THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 525 (Boston, Little Brown
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The result in Trombley is not inherently inconsistent with the original
theory of federal eminent domain. The federal government was required to rely
on the states to take, but the states did not have to cooperate. And if a state
wanted to categorically refuse to take land for federal projects in its own
constitution, that was a question of state law. To be sure, nearly every state had
a public use requirement, and if every state had always followed the Trombley
rule, the scheme of relying on states would not have worked. But Trombley was
an unusual decision, and most states had not interpreted their constitutions in
the same way.
The true creation of the federal eminent domain power came when the
Supreme Court’s decision in Kohl upheld a federal taking power for the first
time. Yet the process leading to Kohl also reflects the ambiguity attending
federal eminent domain in this period. While Congress had occasionally
authorized eminent domain before Kohl, it had done so only recently and
infrequently, and it did not actually do so (or need to do so) in Kohl itself. At
the same time, once the Court manufactured the issue during litigation, the
parties did not firmly resist it either. The federal eminent domain power had
not yet become a firm part of national practice, yet understandings around it
were rapidly changing.
The lack of statutory authorization can be discerned from the tangle of
federal and state statutes in the case. In March 1872, Congress passed a statute
“authoriz[ing] and direct[ing]” the Secretary of the Treasury “to purchase a
central and suitable site in the city of Cincinnati, Ohio” for a federal
building.286 The bill also provided that no money could be spent for the
purchase until Ohio consented to federal jurisdiction over the land. As usual,
Congress did not grant any condemnation authority. Also as usual, the state
did.
The first state statute in aid of the project, passed in April 1872, provided
that the state would cede jurisdiction when “the United States shall have
acquired the title to the said land or lands by purchase or grant, or by lawful

286.

& Co. 1868) (citing Pollard’s Lessee, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845)). But he then went on to
add that
[s]o far, however, as it may be necessary to appropriate lands or other property
for its own purposes . . . the general government may still exercise the right
within the States, and for the same reasons on which the right rests in any case,
namely, the absolute necessity that the means in the government for performing
its functions and perpetuating its existence should not be subject to be controlled
or defeated by the want of consent of private parties, or of any other authority.
Id. at 526.
Act of Mar. 12, 1872, ch. 45, 17 Stat. 39, 39.
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appropriation under the right of eminent domain” (without specifying who
would authorize any eminent domain proceeding).287 A few days later the state
passed a general reform of its eminent domain procedures.288 That June,
Congress repeated the state’s passive reference to eminent domain,
appropriating money “for the purchase, at private sale, or by condemnation, of
ground for” the new building.289 The following February, in 1873, Ohio finally
clearly provided the condemnation authority in a statute authorizing the
United States to “acquire . . . land by appropriation” under the terms of its
recently reformed general eminent domain statute, which required the United
States to pay owners the adjudicated value of their parcels.290
In July 1873, the United States finally initiated the condemnation in federal
court. In its application, the United States expressly relied on the state eminent
domain power. The government represented that it “was authorized to acquire
the land . . . by appropriation” by the “act of the general assembly of the State
of Ohi[o].”291 It mentioned the federal statutes as well, but never suggested
that they were the source of the condemnation power.292 The case thus began
as an ordinary federal-state taking, where there was no need to invoke federal
eminent domain.
There was a state-law wrinkle, to be sure—the Kohls owned a leasehold in
the property, and somebody else owned the rest of the estate. Both of those
property interests were put to trial in a single proceeding,293 even though under
Ohio law, “the owner or owners of each separate parcel shall be entitled to a
separate trial, verdict and judgment.”294 The Kohls maintained that their
leasehold and their landlord’s reversion were “separate parcels” under the law,
and that their trials had been illegally combined, “put[ting] these parties into
antagonism with each other before the jury.”295 But as the United States
dismissively suggested in its appellate brief, the Ohio statute did not grant
separate trials “to every interest in each parcel.”296 And the Supreme Court
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Act of Apr. 20, 1872, § 4, 1872 Ohio Laws 81, 82.
Act of Apr. 23, 1872, 1872 Ohio Laws 88.
Act of June 10, 1872, ch. 415, 17 Stat. 347, 353.
Act of Feb. 15, 1873, § 1, 1873 Ohio Laws 36, 36.
Transcript of Record at 1, Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367 (1875) (No. 144).
Id. at 1-2.
See Brief for the Petitioner at 13, Kohl, 91 U.S. 367.
Id. at 13; see Act of June 1, 1872, 17 Stat. 522. The Ohio statute authorizing federal takings
expressly incorporated these procedures. § 1, 1873 Ohio Laws 36, 36.
Brief for the Petitioner at 13, supra note 293.
Brief for the Respondent at 6, Kohl, 91 U.S. 367 (emphasis added).
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agreed that the lease and reversion could be tried together under Ohio law.297
So nothing would have stopped the condemnation from going forward in the
traditional manner. Instead of resting on these state law grounds, however, the
United States devoted the bulk of its argument to the claim that state law did
not matter, because the federal government had its own eminent domain
power and did not need the state’s.298
This brings us to the second odd thing about the Kohl litigation: the Kohls
did not actually contest the existence of a federal eminent domain power.
Below, one lawyer had argued “that the government did not possess the right
of eminent domain.”299 But E.W. Kitteredge, who represented the Kohls,
focused on statutory arguments—the federal government had not complied
with the Ohio law, and there was no federal statute that authorized federal
eminent domain.
And Kitteredge had a very good point. The first federal statute did not
mention condemnation at all. The second, which was an appropriations
statute, did, but there was no reason to think that the money was intended for
a federal condemnation rather than the usual state condemnation. As the
Kohls’ appellate brief put it:
[I]n view of the uniform policy of the Government, when land was to
be acquired by condemnation, to obtain it under the authority of the
State Government, as the agent of the State in the exercise of its power
of eminent domain, doubtless this mode of acquiring the property was
in the contemplation of Congress.300
The statutory argument was good enough for Justice Field, who dissented.
He, like the Kohls, “assum[ed] that the majority are correct . . . that the right
of eminent domain within the States . . . belongs to the Federal
government.”301 But, he argued, “the provision for the exercise of the right
must first be made by legislation,” and Congress had not done so.302 It had not
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Kohl, 91 U.S. at 377-78 (finding that the statute gives “all the owners of a parcel . . . a trial
separate from . . . the owners of other parcels,” and that “[i]t hath this extent; no more”).
Brief for Appellee at 1-6, Kohl, 91 U.S. 367.
United States v. Inlots, 26 F. Cas. 482, 483 (S.D. Ohio 1873). Though it is not recorded that
way in Westlaw, this was the decision on appeal in Kohl. See Transcript of Record at 16,
supra note 291.
Brief for the Petitioner at 8, supra note 293.
Kohl, 91 U.S. at 378 (Field, J., dissenting).
Id.
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vested the federal courts with jurisdiction over such claims,303 and it had not
given the Treasury Secretary the authority to condemn the land either.304 (The
jurisdictional and substantive points were intertwined; in finding jurisdiction,
the majority had relied on the statutory “investment of the Secretary of the
Treasury with power to obtain the land by condemnation.”305) But it did not
carry the day with the Court.
The opinion in Kohl was the product of strange circumstances. The
constitutional question did not have to be decided. It was not fully joined by
the parties, it was not invoked by Congress, and it was irrelevant because of the
state statute. And the Court did not rely, as it might have, on the recent
authorizations of eminent domain for the Rock Island arsenal or the Civil War
cemeteries. Instead, it held that the uniform practice of the first seventy-five
years had been mistaken, and in doing so made no reference to its prior
statements in Pollard’s Lessee or Goodtitle, where it had said exactly the
opposite.306
G. Conclusion
The basic arc of this history should be striking. Congress’s early practice
was not to use federal eminent domain when it needed land for federal
projects. The alternative path of relying on state takings began remarkably
early, and with little to no criticism. The dissenters were late and relatively few.
They began nearly thirty years after the Founding, and their arguments for the
use of federal eminent domain repeatedly failed to carry the day. Even more
than fifty years after the Founding, the Supreme Court still confirmed the
absence of a federal eminent domain power.
To be sure, part of this history may reflect the actions of those motivated by
politics or convenience rather than constitutional thought. For example, some
might wonder whether the federal government relied on the state eminent
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Id. at 378-79.
Id. at 379 (“Nor am I able to agree with the majority in their opinion, or at least intimation,
that the authority to purchase carries with it authority to acquire by condemnation.”).
Id. at 375 (majority opinion).
Cf. HENRY EDMUND MILLS, A TREATISE UPON THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN 363 (St. Louis,
F.H. Thomas 1879) (noting the inconsistency); Michael H. Schill, Intergovernmental Takings
and Just Compensation: A Question of Federalism, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 829, 833 n.10 (1989)
(same). The lower court acknowledged Pollard’s Lessee and its sequels, and distinguished
them as limited to “general public uses,” not the enumerated powers. United States v.
Inlots, 26 F. Cas. 482, 486 (S.D. Ohio 1873) (citing COOLEY, supra note 285) (“We have not
overlooked the decisions in 3, 9, and 13 Howard . . . referred to by counsel for the defense.”).
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domain power out of economic convenience rather than constitutional need.
Recall that federal takings would have been governed by the Takings Clause,
whereas some scholars have argued that state takings during this time period
were frequently uncompensated.307
I have not surveyed all of the compensation paid in state takings for federal
projects throughout this period, but I can provide several reasons to think that
the economic hypothesis is overstated. For one thing, even though many states
did not initially have takings clauses, compensation was often paid
nonetheless.308 And at least some early authorities thought that eminent
domain inherently required compensation.309 Moreover, federal projects
continued to rely on state takings even later into the nineteenth century. This
was after many states had adopted takings clauses,310 and at least some states
provided quite generous compensation.311 And it was after the state takings
were growing legally cumbersome, mired in complicated issues of state
constitutional law.312 Most importantly, though, the historical materials
surveyed simply do not reveal any discussion of the federal fisc as a reason for
avoiding federal eminent domain—they reveal constitutional objections.
I do not mean to understate the importance of practical and ideological
considerations to the eminent domain arguments throughout this period. The
constitutional arguments against federal eminent domain might have been
abandoned much earlier if the resulting system had proved totally unworkable.
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See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW: 1780-1860, at 63-66
(1977); Treanor, supra note 129, at 785 (noting uncompensated colonial takings).
See James W. Ely, Jr., “That Due Satisfaction May Be Made:” The Fifth Amendment and the
Origins of the Compensation Principle, 36 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 1, 4-13 (1992). Indeed, Treanor
acknowledges that “compensation was the usual practice” even if not “the inviolable rule,”
Treanor, supra note 129, at 788 n.28, and Horwitz acknowledges that “by 1820 . . . statutory
provisions for compensation had become standard practice in every state except South
Carolina,” HORWITZ, supra note 307, at 64.
Gardner v. Trustees of Newburgh, 2 Johns. Ch. 162, 168 (N.Y. Ch. 1816) (Kent, Ch.)
(“[P]rovision for compensation is an indispensable attendant . . . .”); J.A.C. Grant, The
“Higher Law” Background of the Law of Eminent Domain, 6 WIS. L. REV. 67, 71-81 (1930)
(collecting sources).
Grant, supra note 309, at 70.
For example, compensation under the Maryland statute authorizing the Washington
aqueduct apparently tended to be higher than the United States would have liked. See
United States v. Great Falls Mfg. Co., 112 U.S. 645, 658 (1884) (noting a condemnation
proceeding abandoned “perhaps [because] in the judgment of the officers of the United
States, a fair assessment of damages could not be had in the mode prescribed by the
Maryland statute”); see also WAYS, supra note 201, at 16 (noting that Maryland required a
twelve-person jury to determine damages).
See supra Section II.D.
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They also may well have endured for so long in part because they were
consistent with the broader desires of lawmakers and judges. But that is a
general truth about constitutional arguments, not a special charge against the
constitutional arguments opposing federal eminent domain.
iii. the takings clause
The Constitution itself contains an implied recognition of it beyond
what may justly be implied from the express grants. The fifth
amendment contains a provision that private property shall not be
taken for public use without just compensation. What is that but an
implied assertion, that, on making just compensation, it may be taken?
—Kohl v. United States313
But what about the Fifth Amendment? It says that “private property” shall
not “be taken for public use, without just compensation.”314 We all know that
the Fifth Amendment was not intended to restrain the states.315 It seems to
follow that it was intended to restrain the federal government’s eminent
domain power, and hence that the federal government must have one in the
first place.
This is the argument Senator Howard relied upon when urging the Rock
Island arsenal statute, and it was one of the arguments made by the Court in
Kohl.316 It is still made today—by Grace, for example, who argues that “the
only sensible reading of the clause” is “as an implicit recognition of federal
eminent domain power.”317 Viewed in its original context, however, the
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91 U.S. 367, 372-73 (1875).
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
See Barron v. Mayor of Balt., 32 U.S. 243, 250-51 (1833) (holding that the Takings Clause is
inapplicable to the states). To be sure, a sizable minority of respectable lawyers once
thought otherwise. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND
RECONSTRUCTION 145-56 (1998) (discussing the “Barron contrarians”).
Kohl, 91 U.S. at 372; CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1478 (1864).
Grace, supra note 5, at 141; see also, e.g., Abraham Bell, Private Takings, 76 U. CHI. L. REV.
517, 525 (2009) (making the same argument). Currie eschews this argument. See DAVID P.
CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS,
1789-1888, at 435 n.43 (1985) (discussing how this part of Kohl “[is] questionable in light of
the ninth amendment”); see also AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A
BIOGRAPHY 327 (2005) (“[R]eaders should not infer from the language of the Fifth
Amendment just-compensation clause that Congress enjoyed a general power of eminent
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Takings Clause provides no support for a general federal power of eminent
domain.
Kohl invoked the Takings Clause to support the eminent domain power
“beyond what may justly be implied from the express grants,”318 so this Part
will proceed on the assumption that Parts I and II have been persuasive. The
goal here is to show that if I am right that conventional enumerated-powers
analysis did not justify the eminent domain power, then the Takings Clause
did not add to it. Wherever the takings power was in 1789, the Bill of Rights
left it where it found it in 1791.
A. District and Territories
Let us start out by supposing that the Takings Clause must have had some
field of intended operation in 1791. That is, let us assume that the Takings
Clause is evidence of some kind of federal eminent domain power. Even so, the
enumerated power to take in the District and the territories could explain the
Takings Clause.
To the modern eye, this may seem implausible—takings in the District and
territories seem like a relatively minor issue, not the sort of thing that would
have inspired one of the grand phrases in the Bill of Rights. But we know that
rights in the District were invoked by George Mason, who had warned that
without a Bill of Rights, Congress might bring sedition trials “within the ten
miles square.”319 The issue is not hypothetical either—recall the fight over
compensation when Congress authorized the Alexandria Turnpike in the
District.
The power of eminent domain in the territories might have been important
as well. Recall that in 1791, the United States already governed the vast
Northwest Territory, which would later form part or all of six sizable states. It
also governed territory ceded by Virginia that would later become the state of
Tennessee, and it would soon acquire much vaster territorial holdings. The
Clause’s likely purpose should be evaluated in that light.320
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domain. Rather, eminent-domain power, like all other powers, had to be deduced from the
Constitution’s earlier enumerations of governmental authority.”).
Kohl, 91 U.S. at 372.
Mason, supra note 79, at 650.
I am assuming, as most then assumed, that the Takings Clause applied in such territories.
Early on, Congress generally extended the Bill of Rights to the territories by statute, creating
an ambiguity about whether statutory extension was required. See Christina Duffy Burnett,
Untied States: American Expansion and Territorial Deannexation, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 797,
824-27 (2005).
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The connection between the Takings Clause and the territories is not just
one of magnitude. One of the few predecessors to the Federal Takings Clause
was a similar clause in the Northwest Ordinance.321 While the Northwest
Ordinance’s takings clause was worded somewhat differently, Ryan Williams
has noted that the Ordinance, like Madison’s proposal for the Fifth
Amendment, “similarly bundled a law-of-the-land provision with protections
for defendants in criminal cases and a prohibition on uncompensated takings
of private property,” and was “most likely” the “immediate inspiration” for the
Takings Clause.322 This makes sense. If the federal government’s grant of
eminent domain authority was mostly limited to the territories, it is not that
surprising that the Bill of Rights would contain the same limitations that
applied by statute in the vast majority of then-existing federal territory.
Finally, eminent domain in the District and the territories would have been
an important issue to anybody anticipating federal emancipation of slaves.
Some recent scholarship has suggested that protecting the economic position
of slaveholders was a key motivation for the Takings Clause.323 If so, this is
especially consistent with the focus on the territories and the District. There
were few serious proposals to emancipate slaves in the states before the Civil
War. But the territories were very much up for grabs, and slavery in the
District of Columbia was a question of recurring controversy. Indeed, when
Congress did emancipate all of the slaves in the District, the Takings Clause
forced it to appropriate a million dollars to do it.324
B. The Purpose of the Clause
There is scant specific evidence about the purpose of the Takings Clause,
but what little exists is consistent with a very limited federal power of eminent
domain. Nearly all of the Bill of Rights was promulgated in response to
requests from state legislatures or groups of Anti-Federalists. Amendment
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It read: “[S]hould the public exigencies make it necessary, for the common preservation, to
take any person’s property, or to demand his particular services, full compensation shall be
paid for the same.” Northwest Ordinance of 1787, reprinted in U.S.C. at lv, lvi; see also
Treanor, supra note 129, at 831-34 (discussing the origin and possible purpose of this
provision).
Ryan C. Williams, The One and Only Substantive Due Process Clause, 120 YALE L.J. 408, 446
n.156 (2010).
See Stephen Stohler, Slavery and the Political Origins of the Fifth Amendment’s
Takings Clause (Oct. 6, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.sas.upenn.edu/dcc
/workshops/documents/StohlerDCC.pdf.
Compensated Emancipation Act, ch. 54, § 4, 12 Stat. 376, 377 (1862).
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proponents apparently feared that the new federal government might abuse
some of its granted powers, and requested amendments to protect against
them. The Takings Clause, however, is the one exception. It is the one clause in
the entire Bill of Rights that no state or Anti-Federalist group requested.325
Then-Representative James Madison was the one to sift through the many
proposed amendments and propose a slate of them. (A few of his proposed
amendments were not approved by Congress, and a few that were approved by
Congress were not ratified, but the Amendments that became the Bill of Rights
strongly resemble the slate that he originally proposed.) When he put forth his
draft of what became the Fifth Amendment, the Takings Clause was there,
tacked on to the end of some criminal procedure rights and the Due Process
Clause.326
Madison did not specifically discuss the Takings Clause at all. A committee
later made minor changes to the Clause’s wording (also without recorded
explanation). That version passed the House and Senate, and still there was
almost no recorded discussion about the Clause’s purpose.327
There were a few historical precedents for the Clause. As noted above, the
Northwest Ordinance contained a just-compensation requirement. Two
colonial charters (Massachusetts and the Carolinas328) and two state
constitutions (Massachusetts and Vermont329) had a just-compensation
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AMAR, supra note 315, at 78 (“[U]nlike every other clause in the First Congress’s proposed
Bill, the just-compensation restriction was not put forth in any form by any of the state
ratifying conventions.”). Madison also proposed an amendment granting additional rights
against states which (naturally) was not requested by the states, but that proposal did not
make it out of Congress. Id. at 22, 78.
It read,
No person shall be subject, except in cases of impeachment, to more than one
punishment, or one trial for the same offence; nor shall be compelled to be a
witness against himself; nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law; nor be obliged to relinquish his property, where it may be necessary
for public use, without a just compensation.
James Madison, Speech in Congress Proposing Constitutional Amendments (June 8, 1789),
in JAMES MADISON, WRITINGS 437, 442-43 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1999).
Treanor, supra note 129, at 835-36.
Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina, art. XLIV (1669), reprinted in 5 THE FEDERAL AND
STATE CONSTITUTIONS: COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES,
TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES NOW OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 2772 (Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1909); Massachusetts Body of Liberties § 8
(1641), reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES: DOCUMENTARY ORIGINS OF INDIVIDUAL
LIBERTIES IN THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND BILL OF RIGHTS 148 (Richard L. Perry
ed., 1952).
MASS. CONST. of 1780, art. X; VT. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS of 1777, art. II.
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requirement. Other states sometimes provided just compensation by custom or
due process.330 One or more of those clauses may well have been the specific
inspiration for the federal amendment.331
The only other specific clue about the purpose of the Clause is a later
comment by Henry St. George Tucker, who opined that it was “probably”
designed to provide compensation for the taking of personal property by the
military.332 Maybe Tucker was right, maybe he was wrong; we will get to that
later.333 But what is most striking is the thinness of the historical record.
Indeed, the thinness of the record may provide additional reason to be skeptical
about a general federal takings power. After all, the states requested a lot of
potential amendments, including plenty that were never proposed for
ratification. They requested, for example, “the liberty to fowl and hunt in
seasonable times”;334 a rule forbidding public offices from being hereditary;335
and a rule clarifying that states had the right to create congressional districts.336
If there was a widespread belief that the federal government had a broad power
to take land, it is at least somewhat strange that no state or Anti-Federalist
group suggested that it would be wise to limit that power.
Another possible purpose of the Clause derives from Madison’s belief in
the educative power of constitutional text. Madison said when proposing the
Bill of Rights that even “paper barriers” had “a tendency to impress some
degree of respect for them, to establish the public opinion in their favor, and
rouse the attention of the whole community.”337 In other words, he thought
that entrenching rights in the Constitution would help to reinforce their
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Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W. McConnell, Due Process as Separation of Powers, 121 YALE
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1 HENRY ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES app. at 305-06 (Phila., Birch &
Small 1803). For discussions of this claim, see AMAR, supra note 315, at 79-80; DAVID A.
DANA & THOMAS W. MERRILL, PROPERTY: TAKINGS 11-13 (2002); Jed Rubenfeld, Usings, 102
YALE L.J. 1077, 1122-23 (1992); Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 58
(1964); and Treanor, supra note 129, at 835-36.
See infra Section III.D (considering two justifications for Tucker’s claim).
THE ADDRESS AND REASONS OF DISSENT OF THE MINORITY OF THE CONVENTION OF THE
STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA TO THEIR CONSTITUENTS (Dec. 18, 1787), reprinted in 15
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 94, at 13, 19.
VIRGINIA CONVENTION AMENDMENTS (1788), reprinted in 18 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra
note 94, at 199, 201.
Recommendatory Amendments, POUGHKEEPSIE COUNTRY J., Aug. 12, 1788, reprinted in 18
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 94, at 301, 305.
James Madison, Speech in Congress Proposing Constitutional Amendments (June 8, 1789),
in MADISON, supra note 326, at 437, 446-47.
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importance in the public mind.338 William Treanor has suggested that the
Takings Clause in particular had an educative aspect: Madison may have
“trusted that the educative aspect of the clause” would help to limit state
incursions on property rights, even though the Clause did not formally apply
to the states.339 This, too, might explain why Madison proposed a Takings
Clause even in the absence of a broad takings power.
C. The Ninth Amendment
Suppose that a reader is not fully convinced by the possibility of takings in
the District and the territories, nor by the origins of the Takings Clause, and
continues to suspect that the Clause augurs a broader federal power. Another
element of the Bill of Rights should give us further reason not to use the
Takings Clause as a justification for a federal power: the interpretive principles
underlying the Ninth Amendment.
One of the chief objections to including a bill of rights in the original
Constitution was that it would be dangerous. Saying “the Federal government
cannot do x” can create an inference that it can do everything up to the limit of
x. Similarly, saying “the Federal government cannot do x if y” might well cause
sensible readers to infer that it can do x so long as y is not true. That is precisely
the form the Takings Clause takes (no taking without compensation), and that
is precisely the inference that Kohl and its supporters make (takings with
compensation are authorized).
Thus, Hamilton warned that a bill of rights “would contain various
exceptions to powers not granted; and, on this very account, would afford a
colourable pretext to claim more than were granted. For why declare that
things shall not be done, which there is no power to do?” He went on: “They
might urge with a semblance of reason, that the constitution ought not to be
charged with the absurdity of providing against the abuse of an authority,
which was not given . . . .”340 Similarly, James Wilson cautioned that if rights
were enumerated, “everything that is not enumerated is presumed to be given.
The consequence is, that an imperfect enumeration would throw all implied
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For more on this aspect of Madison’s thought, see JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS:
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power into the scale of the government.”341
In 1791, when Congress decided to propose a bill of rights nonetheless, the
Ninth Amendment was designed to answer this objection. James Madison
acknowledged that “one of the most plausible arguments [he had] ever heard
urged against the admission of a bill of rights,” was that it would imply “that
those rights which were not singled out, were intended to be assigned into the
hands of the general government.”342 But, he went on, “it may be guarded
against” by something like the Ninth Amendment.343 Those who use the
compensation right as legal support for a federal takings power are doing
precisely what Hamilton feared, and what the Ninth Amendment was designed
to forbid.
Let’s see how the Ninth Amendment accomplishes this. Kohl improperly
used the enumeration of a right to justify the inference of a power. Madison’s
original draft of the Ninth Amendment had explicitly referred to government
power, stating that “[t]he exceptions here or elsewhere in the constitution,
made in favor of particular rights, shall not be so construed . . . as to enlarge the
powers delegated by the constitution.”344
This language was ultimately removed, however, and the ratified text
instead says: “The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not
be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”345 But when
the changed phrasing was pointed out during the Virginia ratification debates,
Madison explained that the final text carried the same meaning: “If a line can
be drawn between the powers granted and the rights retained, it would seem to
be the same thing, whether the latter be secured by declaring that they shall not
be abridged, or that the former shall not be extended.”346 The Bill of Rights
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The Pennsylvania Convention (Nov. 28, 1787), in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 94,
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and the limited enumeration of powers were effectively two sides of the same
coin.347 Indeed, putting aside the earlier draft of the Amendment, one can state
Kohl’s error in terms of rights instead: Kohl used the enumeration of the right
to compensation to deny the distinct right not to have property (in a state)
taken in the first place.
Madison’s draft of the Ninth Amendment suggested that some rights were
enumerated “merely for greater caution.”348 If that is true of the Takings
Clause, Madison was prophetic. Even if Madison thought there was no
eminent domain power, it is possible that he foresaw that others might
disagree.349 Not much later, Madison saw a power to incorporate a bank
recognized over his objections. Similarly, the Supreme Court has now
recognized a federal takings power, and the Takings Clause is the only thing
that really restrains it.
D. Other Possible Roles for the Takings Clause
It is possible that there are other ways in which the federal government
might have taken property outside of the eminent domain power. Both of these
possibilities are speculative, but there are two potential additional contexts in
which the federal government may have had the power to take some property,
either of which might explain Tucker’s comment about the taking of “supplies
for the army.”350
One possibility is that the government may confiscate personal property,
even if not real property. Land has long been viewed as something special.
William Stoebuck reports that the King had many prerogative powers to
invade property rights, but that the “[o]ne thing the king could never do under
his prerogative powers was to take a possessory estate in land.”351 Apparently
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940-67 (2008) (arguing that the Ninth Amendment also authorizes judicial protection of
unenumerated rights).
For further support for Madison’s claim, see AMAR, supra note 315, at 123-24; McAffee, supra
note 341, at 1225, 1238-48; and Ryan C. Williams, The Ninth Amendment as a Rule of
Construction, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 498, 513 (2011) (“[T]o the Founding generation, the two
concepts were closely linked, as a denial of power to one body was often viewed as
equivalent to a grant of a right to those against whom such power might otherwise have
been exercised.”).
Madison, supra note 337, at 443.
See Michael C. Dorf, The Aspirational Constitution, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1631, 1650-51
(2009) (noting fears that structural protection for rights would be inadequate).
TUCKER, supra note 332, at 305.
Stoebuck, supra note 19, at 564.
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this was part of the key difference between “prerogative power” (which was
“necessary and proper” to the King’s other granted powers) and
“eminent domain” (which was not).352 Similarly, Christopher Tiedeman’s
nineteenth-century treatise suggested that the government’s claim to eminent
domain over land was different than its claim over personal property,353 and
land retains a special character even today.354 Under this view, at least some
confiscations of personal property might well have been “incidental” to
genuinely enumerated powers, even if the eminent domain power to seize real
property was not.355
An alternative possibility—also consistent with Tucker’s theory of the
Takings Clause—is that wartime confiscations were seen as separate from the
eminent domain power. Courts and others sometimes suggested that the laws
of war were an alternative body of law that applied in place of normal
constitutional principles in the appropriate theater.356 Some historians have
described the power of military confiscation as a “belligerent right,” entirely
distinct from the government’s normal “sovereign capacity,” where it is limited
to its enumerated powers.357 A few years before Kohl, the Court upheld the
temporary commandeering (subject to compensation) of three steamboats for
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peace treaty, invoking “the right of eminent domain” that “accompanies the right of making
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speak to enumerated powers under the Constitution; and (3) to the extent the cancellation
had a physical location, it was probably not inside of a state, see Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. 199,
220 (1796) (argument of counsel). For what it is worth, the opinion was also incredibly
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Schnitzer, Note, Into Justice Jackson’s Twilight: A Constitutional and Historical Analysis of
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use during the war effort, relying explicitly on the exceptional nature of war:
“[I]t is the emergency . . . that gives the right, and it is clear that the emergency
must be shown to exist before the taking can be justified.”358 In contrast, when
wartime confiscation was upheld under the Confederate Constitution, the
Supreme Court of Georgia upheld the power as a “necessary implication” of
the enumerated powers, a much more conventional rationale.359
It would take further historical and conceptual analysis into the
realty/personalty distinction and the nature of the war powers to see exactly
how these might have been seen as separate from Congress’s general lack of an
eminent domain power. Or perhaps an exception arose at the intersection of
these two—i.e., the government could confiscate only personal property under
martial law. But to the extent that either or both is true, they might provide a
further field of operation for Madison’s theory of the Takings Clause—and to
the extent that either one might have been true, they would have provided some
reason to adopt the Takings Clause.
iv. constitutional structure
Such an authority is essential to its independent existence and
perpetuity. . . . The right is the offspring of political necessity; and it is
inseparable from sovereignty, unless denied to it by its fundamental
law.
—Kohl v. United States360
Aside from the Necessary and Proper Clause and the Takings Clause, Kohl
offered a third argument for a federal eminent domain power—that it was “a
right belonging to a sovereignty” that was inherent and need not be
enumerated at all.361 This is subtly different from the implicit power theory;
under the inherent power theory, eminent domain was not linked to any
granted power. The inherent powers rationale was repeated in many
subsequent cases, which said that eminent domain “is essential to the
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United States v. Russell, 80 U.S. 623, 628 (1871); see also Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 U.S. 115,
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independent existence and perpetuity of the United States”362 and “requires no
constitutional recognition.”363 These arguments mark the greatest departure
from the original constitutional scheme.
A. Inherent Power
The idea of inherent power is at odds with the basic idea of enumeration.
The Constitution contains a list of powers, and while several of the powers are
open-ended, none provides a reason to think the list is not complete. Indeed,
Article I says that the legislature has the powers “herein granted.”364 Articles II
and III, by contrast, just grant the executive and judiciary “[t]he executive
power” and “[t]he judicial power” without that additional limitation.365 There
may be some basis for thinking that those branches have powers beyond those
enumerated,366 but there is certainly no indication in the text that Congress
does.
Finally, the Tenth Amendment repeats that “[t]he powers not delegated to
the United States by the Constitution” are “reserved to the States respectively,
or to the people.”367 The Tenth Amendment has often been derided as a
truism, but that is so only if the inherent powers doctrine is seen to be false.
Inherent federal power is also at odds with the great powers doctrine. The
insight of the latter doctrine is that a power’s importance does not imply that it
automatically belongs to Congress. It is thus unsurprising that several
seemingly inherent powers, like war and taxation, are enumerated.
One can certainly imagine unenumerated powers that do seem like they
must belong to the government. But that does not imply that the power must
belong to the federal government (i.e., the states collectively) rather than to the
“States respectively.”368 The power to prosecute ordinary violent crime or to
regulate intestate descent certainly seem like inherent government powers, but
we have gotten by just fine by placing those powers in the states rather than
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the federal government.
The inherent power argument is particularly uncompelling in the case of
eminent domain. As for the assertion that eminent domain is “essential,” even
Kohl acknowledged that the government can choose to proceed without it, and
restrict or eliminate it by law.369 And, in any case, the question should not be
whether the power is essential in the abstract. The question is whether it is
essential that the power reside specifically in the federal government. The
uniform early practice strongly suggests that it is not essentially federal.
Kohl’s invocation of this notion of inherent powers (and its expansion in
later cases) has very little support in the text, structure, or early history of the
Constitution itself. It is instead a creature of a late-nineteenth- and
early-twentieth-century jurisprudential trend. As Sarah Cleveland has
chronicled, “In the period between 1886 and 1903, the Supreme Court
embraced an inherent powers theory to uphold broad federal authority in a
series of cases over Indians, aliens, and territories.”370 Cleveland’s fine article,
however, does not do full justice to the spread of the inherent authority
doctrine. She argues that “[w]ithin the boundaries of the organized states, and
with respect to full-fledged citizens, constitutional constraints of federalism,
separation of powers, and individual rights were fully operative.”371 Indeed, she
claims that in those areas the Court was “focused on enforcing a formalistic
vision of the federal government and strictly applied concepts of federalism and
separation of powers to constrain national authority.”372
In fact, some of the Court’s domestic cases from the era—cases “within the
boundaries of the organized states, and with respect to full-fledged citizens”—
bear the marks of the inherent powers doctrine as well. The eminent domain
cases are the most significant examples. Similar language appears in the 1870
opinion in the Legal Tender Cases,373 written (like the opinion in Kohl) by
Justice Strong. Congress’s power to create paper money that is legal tender is
arguably grounded in several of its enumerated powers. Some have suggested
that it is part of the power to “coin money,” because those words have not
always been limited to metallic currency.374 Others suggested that it was
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necessary and proper (assuming that it is not a great power) to borrowing
money,375 or to raising and maintaining an army and navy.376 When the Court
upheld the constitutionality of paper tender, it endorsed some of these theories.
But it also declared that even without an enumerated power, federal paper
money would be constitutional: “[I]n the judgment of those who adopted the
Constitution, there were powers created by it, neither expressly specified nor
deducible from any one specified power, or ancillary to it alone, but which
grew out of the aggregate of powers conferred upon the government, or out of
the sovereignty instituted.”377
The era in which Kohl arose helps to explain a little bit about how the
Court went astray. But that explanation does not necessarily provide reason to
retain it. Even as federal power has grown far beyond what it was understood
to be in the nineteenth century, legal scholars are increasingly skeptical of the
Court’s assertions of inherent federal authority,378 and with some justification.
Theoretically, one can subscribe to a view of “inherent” power that is still very
limited in scope. But in practice, the inherent powers doctrine has quickly
spread from one area to another, and once the constitutional text and history
are surpassed, it is hard to keep the doctrine anchored. To say that federal
power is inherent, rather than simply vast, is thus perilously close to saying
that it need not be justified in traditional constitutional terms at all.
The recognition of this kind of spreading inherent power has effects
throughout the constitutional system. Arguments for inherent power can slide
toward arguments for unlimited power. Once a court has concluded that the
enumerated powers do not limit Congress, it is easy enough for it to conclude
that individual rights do not limit it either.379 What can be done to structural
norms can be done to liberty norms.
Moreover, even for those who believe that politics, not judicial review, is
the primary safeguard of federalism, a Court-sanctioned inherent powers
doctrine ought to be problematic. These scholars argue that the courts should
defer to the political branches’ views about the constitutional authority for
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federal action.380 But by abandoning the very idea of limited congressional
authority, the Court is not just deferring to congressional judgment that a given
law is within its constitutional powers. It is suggesting that the constitutional
limits do not matter at all. In other words, there is nothing left for political
safeguards to safeguard.
Finally, even if some more limited version of the inherent powers doctrine
is to be maintained, it is far from clear that eminent domain should be part of
it. The main places where the Court has sometimes found inherent federal
authority have something important in common—they are areas where the
Constitution disables state power to some degree. For example, courts have
found that states have limited authority to regulate immigration or Indian
tribes.381 Article I, Section 10 prevents states from creating paper money, or
from keeping troops or waging war without congressional consent.382 But as
we have seen, federal law did not prevent states from exercising eminent
domain where necessary for federal projects—the norm was cooperation, not
exclusivity.
B. Sovereignty
A different, more limited, way of putting the inherent power argument
might be to say that there are a few specific powers that are traditionally
considered “incidental” for all sovereign governments. Gary Lawson and David
Kopel, for example, concede that the “inherent rights” argument that “the
power did not need to be traced to any particular constitutional source” is
“inconsistent with first principles of the Federal Constitution.”383 At the same
time, they argue:
The 1876-1883 cases suggesting an inherent federal power of eminent
domain were, however, correct in one limited respect . . . : eminent
domain has always been a traditional aspect of sovereign power.
Indeed, one might fairly say that, as “a right belonging to a
sovereignty,” eminent domain has been an incident of sovereign power

380.
381.
382.

383.

E.g., Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100
COLUM. L. REV. 215, 287-93 (2000).
Cleveland, supra note 370, at 61-62, 106-08.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall . . . coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make
any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts.”); id. cl. 3 (“No State
shall, without the Consent of Congress . . . keep Troops . . . or engage in War, unless
actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay.”).
Lawson & Kopel, supra note 5, at 281.

1804

rethinking the federal eminent domain power

by custom. That alone would not necessarily confer it on a government
of limited and enumerated powers (since agency instruments, such as
constitutions, can always exclude incidental powers altogether or limit
them more strictly than the common law baseline), but it does provide
good reason to construe the Necessary and Proper Clause to include a
power so closely and intimately tied to the very nature of sovereignty.384
It is true that there are some rules of sovereignty that seemed to adhere in
both federal and state governments without being expressly stated. For
example, both the federal and state governments were widely thought to have
sovereign immunity, whatever its scope may be.385 The rule against legislative
entrenchment (i.e., the rule that the current legislature has a sovereignty that
the past legislature cannot give away) might be another example of such a rule.
But inherent powers present a different problem, in light of the explicit
decision to enumerate and thus limit the powers of the federal government.
More importantly, it is simply not the case that eminent domain has always
“been an incident of sovereign power by custom.”386 For a very long time after
the Founding, the specific custom in the United States was to the contrary.
These kinds of conceptual arguments from sovereignty are particularly
slippery in the context of the federal system. While it is certainly true that both
the federal and state governments can be seen as “dual sovereigns” in some
respects, in another sense sovereignty in the federal system is divided between
two partial sovereigns. To determine whether a given power belongs to one or
both of the sovereign governments in the United States requires a more
particular inquiry into how the Constitution treats the power. If the great
powers theory and subsequent history are convincing, then the sovereignty of
the federal government provides no reason to be unconvinced.
C. Separate Spheres
The Court’s opinion in Kohl did address the then-established tradition of
federal reliance on state takings, although it did not do justice to the tradition’s
depth. Rather, the Court suggested that the tradition was actually
unconstitutional.
The Court conceded that the states had “[i]n some instances” condemned
land for federal use, but declared that Justice Cooley’s opinion in Trombley v.
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Humphrey, invalidating such takings, was “founded . . . upon better reason.”387
According to the Court, “[t]he proper view of the right of eminent domain
seems to be, that it is a right belonging to a sovereignty to take private property
for its own public uses, and not for those of another.”388 The Court described a
vision of “separate sovereignties” or “spheres,” under which neither the federal
nor state government could ever be “under the necessity of applying to the
other for permission to exercise its lawful powers.”389 Rather, any federal
power “must be complete in itself. . . . The consent of a State can never be a
condition precedent to its enjoyment.”390
As a categorical description of the federal structure, this isn’t true. Under
the text of the Constitution, both the federal and state governments must
sometimes “apply . . . to the other for permission to exercise [their] lawful
powers.”391 States must apply for federal permission to exercise a range of
military and commercial powers.392 Similarly, the Enclaves Clause requires the
federal government to apply for state permission before altering the state’s
boarders or taking exclusive jurisdiction over a federal enclave.393 It is not
unthinkable that the federal government might also have to seek state
permission for another aspect of federal enclave construction.
In a sense, the Court’s claim is inconsistent with any limitations on the
means available under the Necessary and Proper Clause. If there are any
potential means for executing a power that are not provided to the federal
government, it follows that the federal government must “apply” to the states
for help if it wishes to execute it in that way. And as we have seen, there is
much evidence suggesting that at least a few means were not delegated to
Congress.
To be sure, there are some other judicial decisions from that time that
endorse such a “separate spheres” approach to federalism, suggesting that
neither federal nor state government ever has a role in checking the power of
the other. Kohl relied, for example, on Ableman v. Booth, an opinion by Chief
Justice Taney holding that it is unconstitutional for state officers to issue writs
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of habeas corpus to those unlawfully held by federal authorities.394 Another
contemporary case employing the same logic was Kentucky v. Dennison, which
had held that federal courts could not enforce the Constitution’s Extradition
Clause against a state officer, under similar reasoning about separate
sovereignties.395
But history has not treated this version of the separate spheres theory well.
Scholars now regard the reasoning of Ableman (and its sequel, Tarble’s Case396)
as reflecting a deep misunderstanding of the Constitution.397 And when the
Court overruled Kentucky v. Dennison in 1987, it unanimously condemned it as
“the product of another time.”398 That characterization was accurate, but it is
also ironic. The separate spheres model does date to “another time,” but that
time is not really the Founding—it is the period several generations after the
Founding, when decisions like Kohl began to construct a new regime of
national power.399
v. implications and further directions
History is ultimately only worth what we decide it to be. So rethinking the
foundations of the federal power of eminent domain does not automatically
carry with it any one particular set of normative implications. As H. Jefferson
Powell has put it, “history itself will not prove anything nonhistorical” and
“never obviates the necessity of choice.”400
This makes it difficult to provide one set of normative implications for all

Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506, 514-17 (1859).
65 U.S. (24 How.) 66, 106-08 (1860), overruled by Puerto Rico v. Branstad, 483 U.S. 219
(1987).
396. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397, 411-12 (1871).
397. See, e.g., Edward A. Hartnett, The Constitutional Puzzle of Habeas Corpus, 46 B.C. L. REV. 251,
265 (2005) (“There is no shortage of scholars who reject Tarble’s Case or who seek to cabin
it.”); id. at 265-68 (citing sources); Daniel J. Meltzer, Congress, Courts, and Constitutional
Remedies, 86 GEO. L.J. 2537, 2567 (1998) (“I would hesitate to make a constitutional
argument dependent on the continuing force of a constitutional reading of [Tarble’s
Case].”). Many argue that the result in Tarble’s Case can be justified on statutory grounds,
though Ableman was decided before the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, and hence may be
harder to justify. See Stephen I. Vladeck, The Suspension Clause as a Structural Right, 62 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 275, 279 (2008).
398. Branstad, 483 U.S. at 230.
399. For further discussion of separate spheres sovereignty as a post-Civil War construction, see
DUNCAN KENNEDY, THE RISE & FALL OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT 31-40 (Beard Books
2006) (1975).
400. H. Jefferson Powell, Rules for Originalists, 73 VA. L. REV. 659, 662, 691 (1987).
394.
395.
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readers. The implications of the historical recovery will depend in part on the
interpretive framework one brings to it. A full-blown defense of one’s
interpretive framework, or an exploration of each of the competing
frameworks, would be a separate substantial project in itself.
Nonetheless, I think it important to stress several ways in which the
inquiry is likely relevant under some major interpretive theories, and perhaps
to understanding some modern disputes. Most transparently, the history
should be of great importance to any originalist understanding of Congress’s
eminent domain power—although there remain a series of questions about
vagueness, constitutional change, reliance, and so on, which I will discuss but
not try to definitively resolve. That goes as well for those many interpreters
who think original meaning is relevant but nondispositive.401 Additionally,
however, the history may illuminate some broader interpretive questions about
federalism and Congress’s enumerated powers. This, too, is partly originalist.
But since current federalism doctrine relies in part on original history—such as
in construing the Necessary and Proper Clause—even nonoriginalists may feel
more compelled to give some heed to the history.
A. Interpretive Problems
The Framing-era understanding and early history of eminent domain are
relevant to forms of originalist interpretation. Under these theories, the
Constitution’s terms, and thus the scope of its grants of authority, are
understood with the scope they had when originally enacted. And while
originalists subdivide on questions like the comparative importance of original
intent versus original meaning, the inquiry does not seem to be that different
in this context. The Necessary and Proper Clause meant that many powers, but
not every power, were implied, but the details of this meaning are apparent
from some of the specific examples of powers that were thought to be included
and excluded. As I will discuss below, the relative indeterminacy of the Clause
and the idea of great powers it incorporated lend themselves to a historical
inquiry focused on concrete practices.
1. Vagueness and Liquidation
The idea of great powers potentially helps us to understand a great deal

401.

See the examples cited supra notes 7-8. As I’ve put it before, for those who think originalism
relevant but nondispositive, “methodological objections should go to weight, not
admissibility.” William Baude, Signing Unconstitutional Laws, 86 IND. L.J. 303, 305 (2011).
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about the limitations of the Necessary and Proper Clause and how sensible
people could have thought eminent domain to lie outside the federal
government’s powers under the Clause. At the same time, it is hard to get a
clear sense of the precise boundaries of the idea. Even the terminology was
fluid. Madison referred to “great and important” powers; Marshall referred to
“great substantive and independent” powers. Many others spoke in terms of
“incidental” powers as the opposite of great ones. These ideas were employed
to argue that a given power was or was not beyond the scope of the Necessary
and Proper Clause, but it is hard to find a crisp statement of the principle
beyond the general idea that more important powers are less likely to have
been left to implication.
There are reasons to believe that eminent domain, specifically, was treated
as a great power. But once one tries to look at the issue abstractly, it is hard to
explain why certain powers were thought to be great and others were not. Why
is creating a corporation not a great power, exactly? In McCulloch, Marshall
said that it was because “[t]he power of creating a corporation is never used for
its own sake, but for the purpose of effecting something else.”402 But the same
could be said about the tax power, which Marshall conceded—in the same
paragraph—to be a great power, suggesting that there is more to the
distinction.
Or to take another example, why isn’t imposing criminal punishment a
great power? After all, the Constitution expressly enumerates Congress’s
ability to punish a few crimes—federal counterfeiting, offenses on the high seas
or against the law of nations, and treason403—but it does not explicitly give any
other authority to criminally punish. And if the goal is just to look at the
magnitude of the power in some abstract sense, isn’t being subject to criminal
punishment (including death, as many crimes were then punished) a “great”
consequence? Indeed, Thomas Jefferson made this argument as one of his
contentions that the Sedition Act was unconstitutional,404 though his view
seems to have been an outlier.
This is a fair criticism, and potentially a serious problem for those who
wish to make use of the doctrine.405 One of the best criticisms of the existing

McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 411 (1819).
403. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 6, 10; id. art. III, § 3, cl. 2.
404. Kentucky Resolutions of 1798 and 1799, supra note 31, at 540.
405. For more criticism along these lines, see National Federation of Independent Business v.
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2627-28 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the
judgment in part, and dissenting in part); and Andrew Koppelman, “Necessary,” “Proper,”
and Health Care Reform, in THE HEALTH CARE CASE: THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION AND
ITS IMPLICATIONS (Nathaniel Persily et al. eds., forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 8-12),
402.
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work in this area is that we do not have anything approaching a clear test for
deciding whether each particular unenumerated power is incidental or great or
somewhere in between. But this does not mean that we are entirely at sea, for
the “great powers” idea remains useful in two distinct respects.
First, it provides a framework—or at the very least, a vocabulary—for
articulating a limiting principle for the Necessary and Proper Clause. Whatever
one thinks about some of the specific examples discussed throughout this
Article, many people can imagine some laws genuinely designed to implement
Congress’s powers that nonetheless seem deeply inconsistent with the
structure of the Constitution—perhaps a law requiring governors in every state
to be subject to Senate confirmation before taking office, or something even
more farfetched. The great powers idea articulates what is wrong with such
laws.
Similarly, the doctrine helps make sense of specific historical assertions and
practices that otherwise seem nonsensical. Modern readers may wonder how
abrogating state sovereign immunity, or commandeering state legislatures, or
condemning land for federal purposes, could ever have been thought to be
outside the scope of the Necessary and Proper Clause—even when faced with
overwhelming evidence that early interpreters thought that way. The “great
powers” idea is part of the interpretive answer.
Going forward, even if the idea is too vague to be consistently applied by
judges, because we cannot know for certain what is in and what is out—and I
will get to judges in a moment—it can be useful in nonjudicial constitutional
interpretation. Congress and the President (at least theoretically, and
sometimes actually) are supposed to decide whether the laws they pass and
implement are constitutionally permissible.406 In making such decisions, they
need not restrict themselves to doctrines that judges can articulate at a
satisfactory level of specificity.
Second, I do believe that judges can also use the doctrine, in a more
minimal way. While we may lack a good formulation for why a power was
great in the abstract, we do have some specific evidence about powers that
seem to have been thought great, either at the Founding or in post-ratification
thought and practice. So even if courts cannot reason deductively about
whether each power satisfies the “great powers” test, they can reason
inductively. We do have particular examples of powers that were discussed as

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2010192. I discuss the mandate specifically—and my basic
sympathy with Koppelman and Justice Ginsburg on the vagueness point—infra Subsection
V.B.1.b.
406. The standard reference is Paul Brest, The Conscientious Legislator’s Guide to Constitutional
Interpretation, 27 STAN. L. REV. 585 (1975).
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being great, and further scholarship may soon catalog more fully what powers
were so considered and why. In other words, if there is a sufficiently strong
historical case as to a particular practice, judges can still conclude that it is a
“great power” (and hence, as the Court is now inclined to put it, the law is not
“proper” even if it is “necessary”).407
Much of this particularistic evidence is based on post-ratification practice.
That provides a separate puzzle for originalists, because it is not clear why
subsequent beliefs about the greatness of a power are relevant to establishing
whether it was great at the Founding. Originalists ought to think the
post-ratification practice relevant, however, for two reasons. The first is simply
that post-ratification practice can frequently be indirect evidence of Foundingera thought. It is reflected light, to be sure, but light nonetheless.
But the second, and perhaps more important, reason is that
post-ratification practice can serve to give concrete meaning to a constitutional
provision even if it was vague as an original matter. While it may seem slightly
counterintuitive, this is consistent with an originalist theory of constitutional
construction, so long as the Constitution was intended to allow subsequent
interpreters to render it more concrete.
Madison’s term for this practice was “liquidation.” In The Federalist he had
observed that “[a]ll new laws, though penned with the greatest technical skill,
and passed on the fullest and most mature deliberation, are considered as more
or less obscure and equivocal, until their meaning be liquidated and ascertained
by a series of particular discussions and adjudications.”408 In other writings, he
would also refer to the “liquidat[ion]” of constitutional ambiguities.409 Others

I bracket the suggestion that the Necessary and Proper Clause and the great powers doctrine
were themselves intended to evolve with the times, see Wesley J. Campbell, Commandeering
and Constitutional Change, 122 YALE L.J. 1104, 1179 (2013), although this is possible in
principle, see JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 3-34, 277-319 (2011). I will note that it is
more difficult to derive a determinate meaning of the Clause under such a theory, and
liquidation may prove the more viable alternative. Moreover, the arguments supporting a
broad and evolving concept of necessity may actually bolster the case for a more fixed
concept of propriety through the “great powers” doctrine.
408. THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, supra note 45, at 183 (James Madison).
409. E.g., Letter from James Madison to Judge Spencer Roane (Sept. 2, 1819), in 3 LETTERS AND
OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 143, 145 (Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott 1867) (“It could
not but happen, and was foreseen at the birth of the Constitution, that difficulties and
differences of opinion might occasionally arise in expounding terms and phrases . . . and
that it might require a regular course of practice to liquidate and settle the meaning of some
of them.”); see also Caleb Nelson, Stare Decisis and Demonstrably Erroneous Precedents, 87 VA.
L. REV. 1, 10-14 (2001) (noting that Madison emphasized that “a regular course of practice”
could “liquidate and settle the meaning” of those written laws that were ambiguous in a
dispute); Stephen E. Sachs, The “Unwritten Constitution” and Unwritten Law, 2013 U. ILL. L.
407.
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invoked the same concept in slightly different terms, such as McCulloch’s
reliance on “the practice of the government” and “[a]n exposition of the
constitution, deliberately established by legislative acts.”410 The most sensible
approach for judges to take to the concept of great powers is to treat the
concept as sufficiently ambiguous that it often will not justify invalidating an
act of Congress, but as one that can be made clear by subsequent practice that
adequately liquidates its meaning.411
2. The Civil War and Constitutional Change
Even once a text’s meaning has been “liquidated,” though, history has a
way of carrying on. As we have seen, eminent domain practice and theory
changed during and after the Civil War. This might prompt one to argue that
the Civil War changed the constitutionality of the eminent domain power.
Even if Congress did not have it before the war, the argument might go,
Congress got it afterward. The Court’s opinion in Kohl never attempted to
justify its holding on these ground of Civil War-era constitutional change, nor
has any subsequent scholarship. If such an argument could be made, it would
be a little more complicated than that.
It is important to separate descriptive and normative constitutional change.
Not everything that happened during the Civil War changed the meaning of
the Constitution going forward. The Civil War certainly did yield many valid
changes to constitutional federalism. For example, the Reconstruction
Amendments grant many new rights against state governments, and Congress
has expanded powers to enforce those rights. At the same time, the Civil War
did not change everything about federalism. The Constitution was not
abolished and replaced; it was amended.412

410.

411.

412.

REV. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 15-17) (discussing the original convention of
liquidation).
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 401 (1819). See generally Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive
Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 525-29 (2003) (noting that Madison’s contemporaries
“made repeated references to the role of practice in ‘fixing’ the Constitution’s meaning”).
Accord Manning, supra note 47, at 1375 (“[T]he most important factor in assessing the
[Necessary and Proper C]lause’s present meaning may be, in Madison’s words, the way it
came to be ‘liquidated’ over time.”).
See Richard A. Primus, The Riddle of Hiram Revels, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1681, 1709 (2006) (“It
would be extravagant to claim that events of the 1860s erased all of that previous system.
Nobody thinks that the Civil War and Reconstruction cast doubt on whether Presidents
should serve four-year terms.”); see also HAROLD M. HYMAN, A MORE PERFECT UNION: THE
IMPACT OF THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION ON THE CONSTITUTION 546 (1973)
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Indeed, for the Civil War’s victors, legal continuity was generally a key part
of the narrative of the Civil War and Reconstruction. President Lincoln had
justified the war by arguing that the states had never left the Union.413 Even the
Reconstruction governments preserved a fiction of legal continuity with future
and subsequent regimes. To be sure, there were plenty of radicals who argued
that secession justified a major break in the legal order, but their views were
frequently marginalized in practice, for better or worse.414 There is thus a case
for seeing Civil War-era constitutional change strictly in formal or technical
terms.
Perhaps some broader theories, however, under which the Civil War
produced important nontextual constitutional change, could justify the
expansion. Not all of them would. Akhil Amar, for example, has recently
argued that the enactment of the Reconstruction Amendments fundamentally
changed certain constitutional structures—like the Republican Guarantee
Clause or the national army—that were embodied in the very amendment
process.415 But eminent domain did not play a role in the enactment of the
Amendments. It is not even clear that it played an important role in the Civil
War itself.416 The emancipation of slaves by the Thirteenth Amendment may
resemble eminent domain in a sense, but the taking was uncompensated and
accomplished through explicit constitutional amendment.
Richard Primus has argued that “we can understand the Civil War and
Reconstruction as having nullified aspects of the prior legal order that harmed
African Americans.”417 Beyond the Reconstruction Amendments themselves is
“a social meaning that speaks to the changed status of black Americans and
says more than the Amendments say on their own. On such a reading, the
constitutional rupture is most pronounced when the status of black Americans
is at issue.”418 This understanding would also not justify the modern federal
eminent domain power, which is not generally seen as a tool of racial justice or

413.
414.
415.
416.
417.
418.

(“Despite the persistent contrary tradition that a vast centralization resulted from the War
and Reconstruction, it is difficult today to substantiate the thesis.”).
President Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861), in ABRAHAM LINCOLN:
SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 1859-1865, at 215, 218 (Don E. Fehrenbacher ed., 1989).
See John Harrison, The Lawfulness of the Reconstruction Amendments, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 375,
390-93 (2001) (canvassing views).
AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND
PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY 79-94 (2012).
See supra Section II.E.
Primus, supra note 412, at 1709.
Id. at 1710.
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a vindication of the rights of African Americans.419 But perhaps it could justify
an expanded eminent domain power in limited circumstances, where it is used
to vindicate the rights of racial minorities.
Bruce Ackerman’s theory of constitutional moments might be more
conducive to justifying a general federal eminent domain power, however. For
Ackerman, the core implication of the constitutional politics of the period was
to legitimate the otherwise vulnerable Reconstruction process and the
amendments it produced.420 Yet Ackerman also hints that the constitutional
moment may have had a broader nationalist penumbra—for example, when he
suggests that it legitimated the high-salience Legal Tender Cases.421 Ackerman
does not suggest that the transformation extended to other federal powers,
such as eminent domain. But perhaps he could. Justice Strong, a staunch
unionist who fought for the constitutionality of the draft as a Pennsylvania
Supreme Court justice, was the author of both Kohl and the Legal Tender Cases,
and both cases employ some of the same rhetoric of inherent national power.
Then again, perhaps the cases are different. The legal tender issue was
apparently so central to President Grant that he picked his nominees to the
Court (like Justice Strong) because of how they would vote in the case.422
Federal eminent domain did not have such salience. Whether or not such a case
could be made, for present purposes it is enough to reiterate that the existing
justifications for a federal eminent domain are problematic. If there is a Civil
War-based justification, it is one that has not yet been put forward.
B. Doctrinal Implications
Deciding whether to overrule Kohl, or otherwise limit the federal power of
eminent domain today, would require one to consider not just the interpretive
questions discussed above, but issues like the force of precedent and reliance
interests,423 as well as the comparative roles of the President, Congress, and the

419.

420.
421.
422.
423.

On the implications of eminent domain for racial minorities, see, for example, Brief for
NAACP et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S.
469 (2005) (No. 04-108).
2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 186-252 (1998).
Id. at 239-41.
See Brian Z. Tamanaha, Understanding Legal Realism, 87 TEX. L. REV. 731, 746 (2009).
It is worth noting that in overruling some other subsequent precedents that it thought in
conflict with Pollard’s Lessee, the Court noted that it was “not dealing with substantive
property law as such, but rather with an issue substantially related to the constitutional
sovereignty of the States. In cases such as this, considerations of stare decisis play a less
important role than they do in cases involving substantive property law.” Oregon ex rel.
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courts.424 And while one never knows, it may well be that it is simply too late to
return to the original understanding of federal eminent domain.
But even if that is so, the history of federal eminent domain is also a key
that may help us unlock some broader questions about federalism today. When
adjudicating modern federalism cases, the Supreme Court increasingly invokes
a version of the great powers argument, but without a thorough explanation
(or even obvious awareness) of the roots of the idea it is invoking. In other
realms of federalism, cooperative federalism is sometimes treated as if it were a
modern innovation, inconsistent with the spirit of the Constitution as
originally enacted. The historical context provided by the history of eminent
domain may help us to better understand what is going on in both areas.
1. Necessary and Proper Clause
a. Commandeering and Sovereign Immunity
Some of the Court’s most noted modern federalism cases concern topics
like sovereign immunity and commandeering. But the cases have been
criticized as both trivial and textually indefensible. Some scholars complain, for
example, that commandeering and sovereign immunity are peripheral matters
“with mostly symbolic impact.”425
Others challenge the cases on textualist grounds. John Manning charges
that in Printz v. United States, “[t]he Court made no real attempt to tie the
anticommandeering principle to any explicit clause of the Constitution.”426
Similarly, he argues, Alden v. Maine “still places material reliance on the
atextual, purposive technique that characterized . . . the anticommandeering
cases. No clause of the Constitution supplied the source of this broad
immunity from suit.”427 Mitch Berman makes a similar claim. After observing
that the Necessary and Proper Clause is increasingly relevant to federalism
disputes, he states that “[i]t is implausible that proper resolution of cases of

424.

425.
426.
427.

State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 381 (1977). The same could be
said of federal eminent domain.
Even if the Supreme Court refused to overrule Kohl, Congress might reconsider the
sweeping condemnation authority given by 40 U.S.C. § 3113 (2006), or the President might
consider increased reliance on state eminent domain.
Lynn A. Baker & Ernest A. Young, Federalism and the Double Standard of Judicial Review, 51
DUKE L.J. 75, 159 (2001).
John F. Manning, Federalism and the Generality Problem in Constitutional Interpretation, 122
HARV. L. REV. 2003, 2032 (2009).
Id. at 2036.
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this sort will turn on the original public meaning of the word ‘proper.’”428
Yet there is a textualist thread running through the anticommandeering
and sovereign immunity cases. The opinions in these cases are full of historical
and structural arguments, to be sure, but they also try to provide a textual
home for these arguments by invoking the idea that a law that is “necessary”
might not be “proper.”429 Recall the crucial paragraph in Printz, quoted again
in Alden, arguing that
[w]hen a “La[w] . . . for carrying into Execution” the Commerce Clause
violates the principle of state sovereignty reflected in the various
constitutional provisions . . . it is not a “La[w] . . . proper for carrying
into Execution the Commerce Clause,” and is thus, in the words of The
Federalist, “merely [an] ac[t] of usurpation” which “deserve[s] to be
treated as such.”430
The Court did not unpack this claim very much, but what it says is
consistent with the great powers idea. Indeed, the Court might better have said
that the reason that the Necessary and Proper Clause does not extend to laws
that commandeer or that violate state sovereign immunity is that broaching the
historical core of state sovereignty is something that one ought to expect the
Constitution to have done explicitly. Hence, it cannot be done by implication
and is in other words a great power.431
This is not necessarily to say that all of these cases read the history
correctly. While Congress may have lacked the power to commandeer state
legislatures, some scholars have called Printz’s analysis of executive
commandeering into serious question.432 Debates about the roots and
understanding of sovereign immunity are well known. But the problem with
these cases, if there is one, is in their historical particulars, not in their failure to
account for the Constitution’s text.
Moreover, the implicit invocation of great powers in these cases
demonstrates the potential relevance of historical analysis of the Necessary and

428.
429.
430.

431.
432.

Berman, supra note 7, at 17 n.38.
See supra notes 32-39 and accompanying text.
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 923-24 (1997) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 33
(Alexander Hamilton) (alterations in Printz)); see also Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 732-33
(1999) (quoting this passage from Printz).
This qualified defense of Alden and Printz is not original to me; it owes much to an
underappreciated section of Nelson, supra note 67, at 1638-52.
See Campbell, supra note 407, at 1153 (arguing that commandeering state officers was
originally seen as bolstering state sovereignty).
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Proper Clause. For all that has changed in constitutional doctrine since the
Founding, some version of the great powers idea is, surprisingly, still good
law. Printz and Alden invoke a version of it; and McCulloch’s reference to “great
substantive and independent powers,” while rarely cited, has never been
overruled. It is worth exploring how that idea might apply in a few other
contexts.
b. Mandates
To get a good sense of how the idea of great powers can and should work
in the law today, it may be helpful to focus on a recent invocation of it. In
arguing that the individual healthcare mandate exceeded the bounds of the
Necessary and Proper Clause, some argued the case against the mandate in
terms of “great” and “incidental” powers,433 and that appears to be the
distinction that the Chief Justice ultimately decided to employ, writing that
while “the Clause gives Congress authority to ‘legislate on that vast mass of
incidental powers which must be involved in the constitution,’ it does not
license the exercise of any ‘great substantive and independent power[s]’
beyond those specifically enumerated.”434
This analysis ultimately turned out to be nondispositive, of course, because
the Chief Justice also concluded that the individual mandate could be
interpreted to impose a tax, rather than a legal command.435 But scholars have
already begun to analyze (and criticize) the opinion’s reasoning on this point,
wondering what kind of constitutional vision it portends in other cases.436
The example of the history of eminent domain may give us the vantage
point to evaluate the Chief Justice’s view. (It is worth noting that the Court
seemed to think eminent domain was a relevant analogy—all three main
opinions discussed the federal power of eminent domain, though none of them

433.
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Brief of Authors of The Origins of the Necessary and Proper Clause (Gary Lawson, Robert G.
Natelson & Guy Seidman) and the Independence Institute as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents, NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-398); Brief for State
Respondents at 33-34, Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566; Brief for Private Respondents at 58, Sebelius,
132 S. Ct. 2566.
132 S. Ct. at 2591 (Roberts, C.J.) (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,
411, 421 (1819)).
It is also possible, as the government and four Justices argued, that the Commerce Clause
authorizes the mandate by itself, without need to reference implied powers. Sebelius, 132 S.
Ct. at 2615-29 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and
dissenting in part).
E.g., Koppelman, supra note 405, at 12-13.

1817

the yale law journal

122:1738

2013

recognized the major historical change implemented by Kohl.437)
On one hand, the Chief Justice was right to look to the idea of great powers
in understanding the limiting principles to power under the Necessary and
Proper Clause. On the other hand, however, comparison with the example of
eminent domain may help to show that he ultimately invoked the idea
improperly.
Recall that the first problem is the vagueness of the great powers
formulation. It may well have been appropriate for members of Congress who
voted on the Affordable Care Act to consider something like the idea of great
powers in deciding whether the Act was constitutionally permissible. But once
Congress decided that it was, the judiciary needed more precise reasoning to be
able to set it aside. As Justice Ginsburg challenged:
How is a judge to decide, when ruling on the constitutionality of a
federal statute, whether Congress employed an “independent power,”
or merely a “derivative” one. Whether the power used is “substantive,”
or just “incidental”? The instruction the Chief Justice, in effect,
provides lower courts: You will know it when you see it.438
Now, it is not that clarity is impossible to achieve; history can provide
some guidance. And one might even argue that the compulsory purchase of
something one does not want borders on being itself a taking. But on balance, I
find that analogy strained, and I find the historical case that the mandate is a
great power seems too weak to justify invalidating the Act. As the Chief
Justice’s opinion acknowledges, there were early individual mandates under the
census and militia powers,439 suggesting that there was no categorical exclusion
of mandates from the Necessary and Proper Clause. Nor did a long string of
practice or judicial decisions demonstrate any constitutional hostility to
mandates. There is no clear historical practice mirroring the practice that
produces the case against federal eminent domain.
c. Conscription
By contrast, history may reveal other powers that are more plausibly part of

437.

438.
439.

See Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2587 n.5 (Roberts, C.J.); id. at 2621 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in
part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part); id. at 2649 n.3 (joint
dissent).
Id. at 2627-28 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and
dissenting in part).
Id. at 2586 n.3 (Roberts, C.J.).
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the extension of the idea of great powers. Take the draft. The Supreme Court
has upheld it.440 Leading scholars defend it.441 There is a strong case to be
made, however—a case that parallels the case against eminent domain—that
Congress lacks the power to conscript troops.442
There is history: until the Civil War, the national army depended on
volunteers.443 President Madison proposed a draft during the War of 1812,444
but it ultimately perished in the face of constitutional arguments by Daniel
Webster, who charged that “in granting Congress the power to raise armies,
the people have granted all the means which are ordinary and usual, and which
are consistent with the liberties and security of the people themselves, and they
have granted no others.”445
As with eminent domain, that history may inform the best reading of the
enumerated powers. As Chief Justice Taney put it in the draft of a never-issued
opinion that would have invalidated federal conscription, “when the power to
raise and support armies was delegated to Congress, the words of the grant
necessarily implied that they were to be raised in the usual manner.”446 In

440.
441.
442.

443.
444.
445.

446.

Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 377 (1918).
For some of the leading defenses, see AMAR, supra note 415, at 88-94; Currie, supra note 240,
at 1196-1201; and Currie, supra note 229, at 1277-95.
A version of this argument was made by Harrop A. Freeman, The Constitutionality of Direct
Federal Military Conscription, 46 IND. L.J. 333 (1971). Two recent draft papers make it more
persuasively. See Robert Leider, Federalism and the Military Power of the United States
(2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author); Andrew Prout, The Constitution’s
Drafting Power (June 11, 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). In earlier
work, Amar also acknowledged the Founding-era case against the draft, AMAR, supra note
315, at 53-59, though he now suggests that the ratification of the Reconstruction
Amendments transformed the understanding, AMAR, supra note 415, at 91-94.
For discussion of the rare (and controversial) exercises of a draft-like power in England, see
Leider, supra note 442, at 43-44; and Prout, supra note 442, at 8-10.
CURRIE, supra note 5, at 172-75.
Daniel Webster, The Conscription Bill (Dec. 9, 1814), in 1 THE PAPERS OF DANIEL WEBSTER:
SPEECHES AND FORMAL WRITINGS 19, 27 (Chalres H. Wiltse ed., 1986). I say “in the face of”
so as to skirt the causation questions. Cf. AMAR, supra note 315, at 333 n.43 (“The precise
degree to which constitutional scruples contributed to the bills’ defeat is the subject of some
dispute.”).
Roger B. Taney, The Thoughts of Chief Justice Taney on the Federal Conscription Act,
printed in 18 TYLER’S Q. HIST. & GENEALOGICAL MAG. 72, 81 (1936). There was a British
tradition of impressment into the navy, and Taney conceded that in light of this history, the
“general words ‘to provide and maintain a navy’ could with much more apparent
plausibility be construed to authorize coercion when a sufficient number of volunteer
seamen could not be obtained.” Id. at 82. Some have suggested that the American
government had special powers and duties with respect to “seamen.” AMAR, supra note 315,
at 330-31 n.28; Randy Barnett, Phillip Hamburger on the Maritime Acts, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY
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Kneedler v. Lane, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court temporarily enjoined the
Civil War draft under the same logic.447 And if it is correct that the power to
raise armies does not include the power of conscription, it seems improbable
that the Necessary and Proper Clause encompasses conscription.448
As with eminent domain, the alternative to a federal draft is not giving
up—it is a federal-state partnership. The government may sometimes need
more soldiers than it can hire on the open market. But the militia can satisfy
that need. Militia service, unlike federal army service, was traditionally
compulsory, and the Constitution expressly gives the federal government
power to force the state-organized militia into federal service. Congress can
“provide for calling forth the militia,”449 and “for organizing, arming, and
disciplining” them.450 And “when called into the actual Service of the United
States,” the President is their commander-in-chief.451 The federal draft acts to
circumvent the militia power, including the important constitutional
limitations on the militia.452
Chief Justice Lowrie made the connection between conscription and
condemnation explicit in Kneedler. In his opinion invalidating the draft he said:
If Congress may institute the plan now under consideration, as a
necessary and proper mode of exercising its power “to raise and support
armies,” then it seems to me to follow with more force that it may take
a similar mode in the exercise of other powers, and may compel people
to lend it their money; take their houses for offices and courts; their ships
and steamboats for the navy; their land for its fortresses . . . . If we give
the latitudinarian interpretation, as to mode, which this act requires, I

447.

448.
449.
450.
451.
452.

(Apr. 19, 2012, 8:46 AM), http://volokh.com/2012/04/19/phillip-hamburger-on-the
-maritime-acts. A fuller exploration of the conscription power would have to be sensitive to
these historical distinctions.
45 Pa. 238 (1863); see also id. at 255 (Woodward, J., concurring) (“I infer that the power
conferred on Congress was the power to raise armies by the ordinary English mode of
voluntary enlistments.”). The court split three to two, and reversed itself after Chief Justice
Lowrie, the original author, left the bench and was replaced with a more nationalist justice.
Id. at 325.
Id. at 242; id. at 257 (Woodward, J., concurring).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
Id. cl. 16.
Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
The power to call forth the militia is limited to “execut[ing] the Laws of the Union,
suppress[ing] Insurrections and repel[ling] Invasions.” Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 15. The
Constitution also “reserv[es] to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and
the Authority of training the Militia.” Id. cl. 16.
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know not how to stop short of this.453
Chief Justice Lowrie thought that the validity of the draft would imply the
validity of federal eminent domain. If he was right about the connection, then
the invalidity of federal eminent domain could also imply the invalidity of the
draft. He was not the only member of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court who
might have seen a connection, by the way. The Pennsylvania Justice who wrote
the second opinion upholding the draft was William Strong, the future author
of Kohl.454
Of course, figuring out whether nonmilitia conscription is indeed
unconstitutional is an issue deserving separate, thorough examination of the
“raise . . . armies” and militia clauses, of any changes wrought by the Civil War
Amendments,455 and of any normative and reliance issues that might be raised
by twentieth-century experience. I raise this example only to show what kinds
of issues might be illuminated by seeing eminent domain as a great power.
d. Other Areas
The great powers idea might help us understand a variety of other
structural claims, as well as claims about the Bill of Rights. I will here mention
only one more possibility. Recall that Alexander Hamilton insisted that the
Constitution did not need a Press Clause because “no power is given by which
restrictions may be imposed.”456 So did many others, not just in public,457 but
also at the Philadelphia Convention, whose records were secret.458 Nowadays,
all of this is widely regarded as obviously wrong.459 But the structure of the
argument against eminent domain helps to show how it could have been right.
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Kneedler v. Lane, 45 Pa. 238, 248 (1863) (emphasis added).
Id. at 274 (Strong, J.).
See AMAR, supra note 415, at 91-94.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, supra note 45, at 417 (Alexander Hamilton).
See Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The “Proper” Scope of Federal Power: A Jurisdictional
Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267, 318 (1993) (collecting public
statements from Edmund Randolph, Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, James Iredell, Roger
Sherman, and Hugh Williamson).
2 RECORDS, supra note 50, at 617-18; see also Stanley C. Brubaker, Original Intent and Freedom
of Speech and Press, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS: ORIGINAL MEANING AND CURRENT
UNDERSTANDING 82, 87 (Eugene W. Hickok, Jr. ed., 1991) (“[T]hat the federal government
would have no power over speech and the press was a stated position and a repeated one,
and perhaps it was believed by some.”).
See, e.g., Brubaker, supra note 458, at 87 (“At least with hindsight, the Federalist claim
appears patently defective.”).
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Perhaps the First Amendment is merely a confirmation of the broader,
structural principle that Congress lacks any implied authority to regulate the
press, because regulation of the press is a great power. Under a great powers
theory, Congress might still be able to restrict the press when regulating under
its expressly enumerated powers.460 Copyright laws restrict one’s ability to
publish the thoughts of others without their consent. Hamilton acknowledged
that the power to tax included the power to tax books.461 And as George Mason
pointed out, there was the question of the District.462 So the First
Amendment’s Press Clause would not have been unnecessary, but even
without it, perhaps the idea was that Congress could not use its implied
powers and the Necessary and Proper Clause to regulate the press.
After Congress passed the Sedition Act, the Kentucky legislature passed a
resolution (first drafted by Thomas Jefferson) declaring the Act
unconstitutional because “no power over the . . . freedom of speech, or freedom
of the press, being delegated to the United States by the Constitution, . . . all
lawful powers respecting the same did of right remain, and were reserved to
the states, or to the people.”463 The resolution argued that this meant the
states, not Congress, had the power to determine when there were exceptions
to these freedoms. The Constitution “manifested” the states’ “determination to
retain to themselves the right of judging how far the licentiousness of speech,
and of the press, may be abridged without lessening their useful freedom, and
how far those abuses which cannot be separated from their use, should be
tolerated rather than the use be destroyed.”464 Jefferson’s theory deserves study
in future work.
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This might explain, incidentally, why “participants in this debate, both critics and
proponents, wrote and spoke as though this was a question to be answered by an analysis of
the powers granted and the definition of the powers set forth in the Constitution,” not just
the Necessary and Proper Clause. Thomas B. McAffee, The Federal System as Bill of Rights:
Original Understandings, Modern Misreadings, 43 VILL. L. REV. 17, 83 (1998); see also CURRIE,
supra note 25, at 262 n.201 (“Attractive as this position may appear at first glance, the
copyright and seat-of-government clauses . . . cut against it.”).
THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, supra note 45, at 446 n.* (Alexander Hamilton).
Mason, supra note 79, at 650.
Kentucky Resolutions of 1798 and 1799, supra note 31; see also Michael P. Downey, The
Jeffersonian Myth in Supreme Court Sedition Jurisprudence, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 683, 695 (1998)
(emphasizing that Jefferson’s principal objection was based on federalism, not free
expression generally).
Kentucky Resolutions of 1798 and 1799, supra note 31, at 540-41. The Resolutions also
argued that Congress could criminalize only treason, counterfeiting, piracy, and crimes on
the high seas and against the law of nations. Id. at 540.
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2. Interactive Federalism
The original takings scheme may also provide insight into modern debates
and understandings of “interactive federalism.” (I use that term to embrace
what is often called cooperative federalism—having states implement federal
policy—while acknowledging that there is another side—empowering the
states to protect local interests, community groups, or individual rights.)
Some subject cooperative federalism to “benign neglect.”465 Even now,
laments Heather Gerken, “scholars often write as if cooperative federalism does
not exist.”466 To the extent that interaction between state and federal
government in carrying out a single program is seen as unusual, it may blind
us to sensible institutional solutions. To the extent it is seen as comparatively
novel, it may cause us to assume that the past has little to teach us about
today’s federalism, or cause us to misinterpret that past.
Others criticize cooperative federalism as a twentieth-century perversion of
our constitutional scheme. Michael Greve, for example, writes that
[n]otwithstanding a famous (but unpersuasive) argument that
American federalism was cooperative ab ovo, and notwithstanding a
handful of “cooperative” policies in the 19th century (such as land
grants), cooperative federalism was largely an invention of the
Progressives, who attempted to reconcile their nationalist ambitions
with their affection for local government.467
The early pattern of takings for federal projects is at least one more data point
against Greve’s thesis.
A single historical doctrine does not a constitutional theory make, and a
wide-lens view of interactive federalism would be a separate, extensive project.
That said, here are two examples of how we might learn from a more
historically oriented sympathy toward interactive federalism.
One example is in the area of constitutional remedies. It is famously
difficult, under current and evolving doctrine, for many victims to get a remedy
for federal wrongdoing. There are judicially and congressionally created
remedies, ranging from lawsuits under Bivens to invocations of the

Heather K. Gerken, Our Federalism(s), 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1549, 1562 (2012).
466. Id.
467. Michael S. Greve, Against Cooperative Federalism, 70 MISS. L.J. 557, 576 (2000). Greve also
marshals social scientific arguments against cooperative federalism, most recently in
MICHAEL S. GREVE, THE UPSIDE-DOWN CONSTITUTION 250-53 (2012). My point is limited to
the historical claims that frame that critique.
465.
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exclusionary rule, to administrative remedies and criminal prosecutions under
18 U.S.C. § 242.468 But what Congress and the courts create, they can also
control, and each of these remedies has been subject to many (and perhaps
increasing) limits on recovery.469 In the original constitutional scheme, states
had a much more important role in providing remedies for federal abuses; as
Akhil Amar, for example, has documented, the original vision relied heavily
upon common law suits against federal officers in state courts.470 In a variety of
ways, however, current law and attitudes resist giving state law its traditional
role in checking federal power.
In these and other scenarios, there is a view of federal law that goes beyond
supremacy, to exclusivity. Whatever problems there may be in determining the
scope of federal power and in finding principled lines to limit that power or
remedies to enforce those limits, state law is presumed to have little or nothing
of relevance to say. It is possible that upon reflection and choice, we would
decide that federal exclusivity is better than any state role in limiting or
enforcing federal law. But we should not forget that that attitude toward the
states is a choice, and that history illustrates a different one we might make.
conclusion
Conventional wisdom about the meaning of the Constitution has changed
a lot since the Founding. Sometimes we are anxious about the change,
sometimes we are glad of it. Most of the time, we are at least aware of it. But
sometimes we forget.
For seventy-five years, federal eminent domain was generally thought
unconstitutional, because eminent domain was too great of a power to be
granted only by implication. That understanding was borne out in a
widespread practice that has now nearly passed from constitutional memory.
Modern debates over federalism continue to claim authority from the past,
though sometimes without a firm grip of what that past was.
Indeed, if we have forgotten the case against federal eminent domain, there
may be a great deal more about modern federalism that bears reexamination. It
may be that Congress’s powers were intended to preserve a substantial space
for state autonomy, even perhaps in implementing (or frustrating) legitimate
federal projects. It may also be that constitutional rights have a more

I will expand these points in William Baude, Original Remedies (work in progress on file
with author).
469. Id.
470. See Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1506-10 (1987).
468.
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pronounced structural dimension than is currently thought. The doctrine that
produces cases like Printz and Alden is not limited to core government
autonomy but includes topics that we currently treat as restricted only by the
Bill of Rights. But the Bill of Rights was the second line of defense for those
who tried to create a federal government that was powerful but limited. It may
be time to give more attention to the first.
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